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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 2007, three foreign nationals, Binyam Mohamed, Abou
Elkassim Britel, and Ahmed Agiza, filed a complaint and demand for jury trial
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.' The
sole named defendant was Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen), a corporation
headquartered in San Jose, California and a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Boeing Company, a publicly traded corporation with headquarters in Chicago,
Illinois.2 The complaint alleged that Jeppesen facilitated the extraordinary
rendition of the plaintiffs by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The
plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen, in conjunction with private charter companies
with histories of working with the CIA,3 had "an integral role" in the
implementation of the rendition program.4 Plaintiffs further alleged Jeppesen
Complaint, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(No. 5:07-CV-02798); see also Bob Egelko, ACLUSues San Jose Firm - CIA 'Rendition 'Role
Alleged, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2007, at A6; Claudio Gatti, Boeing Unit to Face Suit in CIA
Seizures, INT'L HERALD TRm., May 30, 2007; Demetri Sevastopulo, ACLU Sues Boeing Arm
Over CIA Renditions, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d3eb
79e-Oee7-1 1 dc-b444-000b5df1 0621 .html?nclick_check= 1; Kelly Yamanouchi, Jeppesen Unit
Sued Over Alleged CIA "Torture Flights, " DENV. POST, May 31, 2007, at C-01. Mohamed,
Britel, and Agiza amended their complaint on August 1, 2007. See First Amended Complaint,
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 5:07-CV-
02798) [hereinafter Complaint] (including Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, and Bisher al-
Rawi as additional plaintiffs). All references to the "plaintiffs" will be collective unless
otherwise noted. All references to the "complaint" will be to the first amended complaint.
2 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 27. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. acquired its international trip
planning services business now known as Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. in 1989. Yamanouchi, supra
note 1. Jeppesen Sanderson was acquired by the Boeing Company in 2000 and is a subsidiary
ofBoeing Commercial Airplanes. Jeppesen, About Us, Timeline, http://www.jeppesen.com/com
pany/about/timeline.jsp (last visited May 20, 2009).
' The complaint specifically referenced Premier Executive Transportation Services and
Aero Contractors Limited, which the plaintiffs alleged are private charter companies providing
air transport services to the CIA. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 237-52. For a history of Aero
Contractors Ltd. and its involvement with the CIA and extraordinary rendition, see Scott Shane,
CIA Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at A 1.
" Complaint, supra note 1, para. 236; see also Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Boeing
Subsidiary for Participation in CIA Kidnapping and Torture Flights (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/29920prs20070530.html (quoting American Civil Liberties
Union staff attorney Steven Watt as stating, "Jeppesen's services have been crucial to the
functioning of the government's extraordinary rendition program . . . [and] without the
participation of companies like Jeppesen, the program could not have gotten off the ground"). The
flight and logistical support provided by Jeppesen has earned it the moniker of "The CIA's Travel
Agent." Jane Mayer, The CIA's TravelAgent, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 34; see generally
STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006).
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knew or reasonably should have known that the flights it supported involved
rendition and that the governments of the destination states subjected detainees
to torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.' Based upon these
activities, the plaintiffs alleged Jeppesen conspired with and aided and abetted
U.S. and foreign agents in their forced disappearance and torture.
This Article examines the application of the state secrets privilege to
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. The Article first briefly describes the
extraordinary rendition program. The Article then examines the state secrets
privilege and its application to the complaint. The Article concludes that the
plaintiffs cannot overcome the state secrets privilege, and their complaint was
properly dismissed by the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit erred in reinstating the complaint.7
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAM
Extraordinary rendition has been defined as a CIA program "enabling the
clandestine and forcible transportation of terrorism suspects to secret overseas
detention facilities where they are placed beyond the reach of the law and
subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment."8  Extraordinary rendition has been similarly defined by other
sources.9 "Extraordinary rendition" is different from "rendition," which has
been defined as a program to "take terrorist suspects in foreign countries 'off
the streets' by transporting them back to other countries, usually their home
' Complaint, supra note 1, para. 56.
6 Id. paras. 253-56.
' Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev'd, 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009).
s Complaint, supra note 1, para. 2.
9 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (defining
extraordinary rendition as "the clandestine abduction and detention outside the United States of
persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, and their subsequent interrogation using
methods impermissible under U.S. and international laws"). International sources contain
similar definitions. See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, RENDITION, Cm. 7171
(2007), at 6, available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/public
ations/intelligence/20070725isc final.pdf (defining extraordinary rendition as "[t]he extra-
judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of
detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system..."); Venice Comm'n, Opinion on
the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret
Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, 66th Sess., Op. No. 363/2005,
para. 31 (2006) (defining extraordinary rendition as "the obtaining of custody over a person...
not in accordance with the existing legal procedures applying in the State where the person was
situated at the time").
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countries, where they [are] wanted for trial, or for detention without any form
of due process."'"
The extraordinary rendition program was initiated in 1998 by the Clinton
Administration. The rendition program targeted "a small, discrete set of
suspects" that were removed from foreign states and transported to other
foreign states where they were wanted for trial or detention without affording
such suspects the opportunity to contest their removal." Renditions were
subject to several limitations, including an " 'outstanding legal process' "
against the suspect (usually consisting of a conviction connected to terrorist-
related offenses in a foreign state); a CIA profile; review and approval by
senior government officials, including the CIA's legal counsel; the existence
of states willing to assist in the apprehension and incarceration of the suspect;
and diplomatic assurances that the suspect would be treated in accordance with
applicable national laws. 2 With such safeguards in place, the United States
deemed its rendition policy in compliance with international obligations and
domestic law, a viewpoint that was shared by other institutions examining the
practice.' 3 Utilizing this process, the United States returned approximately
seventy terrorism suspects to foreign jurisdictions prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.4
o Eur. Parl. Ass., AllegedSecret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers ofDetainees
Involving Council of Europe Member States, 57th Sess., Doc. No. 10957, para. 26 (2006)
[hereinafter Parliamentary Rendition Report].
1 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 106-07; see also
Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 26.
12 Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, paras. 29-30; see also Stephen P. Cutler,
Building International Cases: Toolsfor SuccessfulInvestigations, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
Dec. 1999, at 5 (noting that the "U.S. Department of Justice prohibits forcible returns without
prior approval by senior U.S. government officials"); Tracy Wilkinson & Bob Drogin, Missing
Imam's Trail Said to Leadfrom Italy to CIA, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 2005, at Al (quoting Michael
Scheuer, the head of the CIA's unit in charge of locating Osama bin Laden from January 1996
through July 1999, as stating, "Each [rendition] had to be built almost as if it's a court case in
the United States").
"3 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding Alvarez's forcible
abduction from Mexico at the behest of agents employed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration did not violate the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty as to bar his
prosecution for alleged complicity in the torture and murder of special agent Enrique Camarena-
Salazar); see also Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 261 (in which the
Committee's rapporteur concluded "renditions may be acceptable, and indeed desirable[,] ...
[and] no person genuinely suspected of a serious act of terrorism should feel safe anywhere in
the world").
"4 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 33.
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The rendition program was significantly modified after September 11.
Based in part upon the October 2001 decision by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to provide overflight clearances and airfield access for military
flights by U.S. aircraft engaged in operations against terrorism and President
Bush's Military Order on the Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism, signed in November 2001, the CIA
modified the rendition program to focus on the capture, detention, transfer, and
interrogation of "high value targets."' 6 These targets were removed from
foreign states where they were found to locations such as Afghanistan, Egypt,
Guantanamo, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Romania,
Thailand, and Uzbekistan, allegedly for the purpose of subjecting such
individuals to detention and interrogation methods that did not comport with
U.S. law or international standards. 7 Regardless of where they occurred or the
" This metamorphosis was best described by Cofer Black, the chief of the CIA's
counterterrorism unit, in testimony before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
Intelligence Committees on September 26, 2002, wherein he stated: "All you need to know is
that there was a 'before 9/1 ' and there was an 'after 9/11'. After 9/11, the gloves came off."
Mayer, supra note 11, at 107.
16 Eur. Parl. Ass., Alleged SecretDetentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers ofDetainees
Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 58th Sess., Doc. No. 11302 rev.,
paras. 61, 91 (2007) (discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's grant of overflight
clearance and airfield access and the identification of "high value targets" by the CIA);
Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 2 (discussing President Bush's military
order). According to Michael Scheuer, intelligence gathering was not a priority of the rendition
program as it existed prior to September 11, 2001. In an interview with the Council of Europe's
Rapporteur, Scheuer stated:
It was never intended to talk to any of these people. Success, at least as the
Agency defined it, was to get someone, who was a danger to us or our allies,
"off the street" and, when we got him, to grab whatever documents he had
with him. We knew that once he was captured he had been trained to either
fabricate or to give us a great deal of information that we would chase for
months and it would lead nowhere. So interrogations were always a very
minor concern before 9/11.
Id. para. 31; see also Mayer, supra note 11, at 107 (describing a memorandum authored by then
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales labeling the post-September 11 rendition policy as the
"New Paradigm," which " 'places a high premium on ...the ability to quickly obtain
information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against
American civilians' ").
11 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 30, 37; see also Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra
note 10, para. 289; AMNESTY INT'L, "RENDrION" AND SECRET DETENTION: A GLOBAL SYSTEM
OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 1 (2006). States permitting extraordinary rendition to occur
included Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy,
Macedonia, Malawi, Pakistan, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Parliamentary
Rendition Report, supra note 10, paras. 34 n.25, 39, 92, 128 n.106, 163, 200, 230, 288.
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identity or nationality of the seized individuals, extraordinary renditions
followed a standard procedure." The existence of the program was disclosed
by President Bush on September 6, 2006.'9 Several other Bush Administration
officials also publicly discussed the program.2" However, their disclosures
were largely limited to the rendition program as it existed before September 11
"8 After seizure and transport to a nearby airport, the detainee was subjected to a process
described as a "twenty minute takeout" in which he was transformed into "a state of almost total
immobility and sensory deprivation." Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 84.
Within this period of time, the detainee was photographed, blindfolded, hooded, and had his ears
muffled and his hands and feet shackled. The detainee's clothing was cut from his body using
knives or scissors. The detainee was then subjected to a full-body cavity search, tranquillized
through insertion of a rectal suppository, and dressed in a diaper or incontinence pad and a loose
fitting set of overalls or jump suit. The detainee was placed aboard an airplane where he was
strapped to a stretcher, mattress, or seat in a manner which prevented movement. Id. para. 85.
'9 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to the Nation
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush transcript.html?_r-
l&pagewanted=all. In his speech, President Bush made the following remarks about the
rendition program:
In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of suspected
terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and
questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency. This group includes individuals believed to be
the key architects of the September the 11 th attacks, and attacks on the U.S.S.
Cole; an operative involved in the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania; and individuals involved in other attacks that have taken the lives
of innocent civilians across the world.... Many specifics of this program,
including where these detainees have been held and the details of their
confinement, cannot be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with
information they could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our
country. I can say that questioning the detainees in this program has given us
information that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks, here
in the United States and across the world.... This program has been subject
to multiple legal reviews by the Department of Justice and CIA lawyers.
They've determined it complied with our laws.... I want to be absolutely
clear with our people and the world: The United States does not torture. It's
against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not authorized it, and I
will not authorize it .... The CIA program has detained only a limited
number of terrorists at any given time. And once we have determined that the
terrorists held by the CIA have little or no additional intelligence value, many
of them have been returned to their home countries for prosecution or
detention by their governments.
Id. President Bush's speech did not use the term "extraordinary rendition" or specifically
acknowledge the practice as described in the complaint.
20 For a summary of disclosures regarding the rendition and extraordinary rendition
programs by the Bush administration, see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 40-46, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. July 1, 2008).
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and only discussed extraordinary rendition in general terms.2  The
extraordinary rendition program was abolished by President Obama in
January 2009.22
21 See id. In remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations on September 7, 2007, then-
CIA Director General Michael V. Hayden described "close collaboration with allied intelligence
services" in the extraordinary rendition program and disclosed approximate numbers of persons
subject to rendition and the flights conducted by the CIA. Id. at 40-41. General Hayden's
predecessors also made limited disclosures regarding the rendition and extraordinary rendition
programs. In testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate on
March 17, 2005, then-CIA Director Porter Goss acknowledged the existence of the rendition
program before September 1I and disclosed the number of persons subject to this program. Id.
at 42-43. On May 2, 2007, then-CIA Director George Tenet stated that he did not believe the
allegations set forth by Khalid El-Masri in his lawsuit seeking damages for his alleged abduction
and detention and that "damage to the national security could result if the defendants... were
required to admit or deny EI-Masri's allegations." Id. at 43. Finally, then-Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice described the rendition program in remarks made on December 5, 2005 in
which she stated that the program was "a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism" utilized
by the United States "[flor decades." Id. at 43-44. To date, the U.S. government has disclosed
only that the extraordinary rendition program was initiated after September 11, that some
individuals have been detained, and the names of some of these detainees, and it denied that the
detentions violated their legal rights. The U.S. government has never confirmed or denied the
participation of any private enterprise in the program.
22 See Exec. Order No. 13,491,74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (prohibiting "violence to life
and person" and "outrages upon personal dignity... whenever such individuals are in the custody
or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States
Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency
of the United States"). The executive order also created a special task force to
study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to other nations in
order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international
obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of
individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with
the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of
the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody
or control.
Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 44,901 (Jan. 27, 2009) (creating a special task
force to review lawful options with respect to the detention and transfer of individuals captured or
apprehended in armed conflict and counterterrorism operations consistent with national security
and foreign policy interests). In his confirmation hearing, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that
the Obama Administration would not continue the program "because, under the executive order
issued by the [P]resident, that kind of extraordinary rendition, where we send someone for the
purposes of torture or for-actions by another country that violate our human values, that has been
forbidden by the executive order." The Newshour with Jim Lehrer: CIA Nominee Panetta May
Face Overhaul of Counterterrorism Measures (PBS television broadcast Feb. 5, 2009); see also
Mark Mazzetti, Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some C.I.A. Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2009, at A14. However, the executive orders do not prohibit rendition as practiced prior
to September 11,2001. See Greg Miller, CMA Retains Power to Abduct, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,2009,
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Ifl. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MOHAMED v. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC.
A. The Plaintiffs'Factual Allegations and Legal Theories
The complaint concerned the extraordinary rendition of five foreign nationals
by the CIA with Jeppesen's alleged assistance. The first identified plaintiff was
Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian citizen residing in the United Kingdom, who
was allegedly subject to extraordinary rendition on three separate occasions to
Morocco, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo.23 Mohamed was incarcerated at
Guantanamo at the time of the filing of the complaint but was released to the
United Kingdom in February 2009.24 The second identified plaintiff was Abou
Elkassim Britel, an Italian citizen, who was allegedly subject to extraordinary
rendition to Morocco.25 Britel was incarcerated at the Ain Bourja prison complex
in Casablanca at the time of the filing of the complaint.
26
The third identified plaintiff was Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza, an
Egyptian citizen who, at the time of his rendition, was seeking asylum in
Sweden.27 Although the Swedish government determined that Agiza
at A l (quoting an unnamed Obama Administration official who stated that "[o]bviously you need
to preserve some tools .... It is controversial in some circles and kicked up a big storm in Europe.
But if done within certain parameters, it is an acceptable practice.").
23 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 57. Mohamed was initially detained in April 2002 while
attempting to return to the United Kingdom from Pakistan. Id. para. 59. While in the custody
of Pakistani security personnel, he was interrogated by U.S. and British intelligence agents and
accused of membership in Al Qaeda. Id. paras. 59-60. In July 2002, Mohamed was transported
to Rabat, Morocco. Id. paras. 65-68; see also Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10,
para. 202. Mohamed was detained at numerous facilities in Morocco until his transfer in
January 2004 to the so-called "Dark Prison" operated by the United States in Kabul,
Afghanistan. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 69-76. Mohamed was transferred to Guantanamo
in September 2004. Id. para. 88.
24 Raymond Bonner, British Detainee Who Claims Abuse to Return to Britain, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2009; see also Robert Verkaik, British Resident to be Freed After Four Years at
Guantanamo Bay, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 17, 2009, at 4.
25 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 90. Britel was initially detained in March 2002 on
immigration charges during a business trip in Pakistan. Id. para. 94. Britel was subsequently
accused of involvement in terrorism and, in May 2002, was transported to Rabat, Morocco. Id.
paras. 95, 100-03. Britel was detained at the Tdmara prison complex in Morocco until his
release in February 2003. Id. paras. 104-07. Britel was re-arrested in May 2003 before he could
exit Morocco on suspicion of involvement in a bombing in Casablanca. Id. para. 113. Britel
was subsequently tried for terrorist activities in Morocco and, in October 2003, was convicted
and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which was subsequently reduced to nine years. Id.
paras. 115-17.
26 Id. para. 117.
27 Id. paras. 119-24. Agiza sought asylum in Sweden following his conviction in absentia in
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demonstrated a "well-founded fear of persecution," his asylum application was
denied in December 2001, and he was expelled from the country.2" Agiza
alleged that he was subject to extraordinary rendition to Egypt immediately
upon his expulsion.29 Agiza remained incarcerated at the Scorpio maximum
security facility within the Tora Complex in Egypt at the time of the filing of
the complaint.30
The fourth identified plaintiff was Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, a
Yemeni citizen residing in Indonesia.31 Bashmilah was ordered to leave
Indonesia in October 2003 by immigration authorities and elected to return to
Yemen by way of Jordan. 32 However, Bashmilah's passport was confiscated,
and he was detained by Jordan's General Intelligence Department upon his
Egypt for alleged membership in the banned Al Gihad organization and subsequent sentence of
twenty-five years in prison. Id. par. 122; see also Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
par. 2.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 20,2005). Agiza alleged that his return to Egypt
would result in his arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 124.
28 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 128; see also Agiza, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003,
para. 2.5.
29 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 133-39. Agiza alleged that Sipo, the Swedish Security
Police, entered into an agreement with the United States to transfer Agiza to CIA custody.
Complaint, supra note 1, para. 129. Agiza was subsequently detained by S~po, placed in CIA
custody and returned to Egypt, where he was transferred to the Egyptian intelligence services.
Id. paras. 133-39; see also Agiza, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, paras. 2.5-.6;
Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 154. In April 2004, Agiza was retried by
an Egyptian military tribunal stemming from his alleged membership in Al Gihad, convicted and
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Complaint, supra note 1, para. 148. Agiza's sentence
was later reduced to fifteen years. Id.
30 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 149. Agiza's extraordinary rendition was subject to
investigation by Swedish authorities and an international tribunal. See Agiza, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, paras. 13.2, 14, wherein the United Nations Committee Against Torture
concluded that Agiza's rendition violated the provision of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prohibiting extradition "where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he... would be in danger of being subjected...
to torture"; see also MATS MELIN, PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN (SWEDEN), A REVIEW OF THE
ENFORCEMENT BY THE SECURITY POLICE OF A GOVERNMENT DECISION TO EXPEL TWO EGYPTIAN
CITIZENS, ADJUDICATION No. 2169-2004 (2005), wherein the Office of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman concluded the Swedish government violated national immigration laws prohibiting
the transfer of persons to a state where there is a substantial likelihood of torture and that the
measures taken by the CIA to obtain custody of Agiza were in contravention of Swedish law and
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In
September 2008, the Swedish government agreed to pay Agiza the equivalent of $450,000 as
compensation for its involvement in his rendition. See Ex-Terrorism Suspect to Be
Compensated, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2008, at A14.
3 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 150.
32 Id. paras. 151-52.
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arrival.33  Bashmilah claimed that he was subsequently subjected to
extraordinary rendition to Afghanistan and Eastern Europe before being
returned to Yemen in May 2005.3' Bashmilah was detained upon his return and
tried, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison by Yemen's Special
Penal Court in February 2006 for using false identity documents while in
Indonesia.35 Bashmilah was released the following month for time served as
a result of his previous detention.36
The final identified plaintiff was Bisher al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen residing
in the United Kingdom and formerly in the employ of M15, the British
intelligence agency, with respect to its ongoing investigation of connections
between the Muslim cleric Abu Qatada and Al Qaeda. 37 A1-Rawi was initially
detained by British police in November 2002 at Gatwick Airport while
attempting to board an aircraft bound for Gambia where he was traveling to
open a peanut oil processing factory.3" AI-Rawi was released three days later
and allowed to travel to Gambia but was detained by the Gambian National
Intelligence Agency upon his arrival in Banjul.39 Al-Rawi alleged that he was
subsequently subjected to extraordinary rendition to Afghanistan and
Guantanamo where he remained until April 2007, at which time he was
released and returned to the United Kingdom.'
According to the plaintiffs, Jeppesen played "an integral role" in their
extraordinary rendition.4' Jeppesen allegedly provided the CIA with
comprehensive flight planning services, including itinerary, route, weather, and
fuel planning; overflight and landing permits; customs clearance; ground
transportation; catering and hotel accommodations, fuel and refueling services;
and aircraft maintenance.42 In providing these services, the plaintiffs alleged
3 Id. paras. 153-54.
3 Bashmilah alleged that he was transported to Kabul, Afghanistan in October 2003. Id.
paras. 157-162. Bashmilah remained in custody in Kabul until April 2004. Id. para. 163.
Bashmilah was then allegedly transferred to a CIA "Black Site" prison at an unknown location
but believed to be somewhere in Eastern Europe. Id. paras. 171-72. See generally
Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 184.
" Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 186-88.
36 Id.
31 Id paras. 193-95.
38 Id. paras. 196-98.
39 Id. par. 203.
1 AI-Rawi alleged that he was transported to Afghanistan and incarcerated in the "Dark
Prison" in Kabul and at Bagram Air Base. Id. paras. 203-16. See generally Parliamentary
Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 173. Al-Rawi was transferred to Guantanamo in
February 2003 where he remained until his release. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 223-27.
41 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 48, 236.
42 Id. paras. 15, 50.
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Jeppesen "knew or reasonably should have known" that the plaintiffs would be
subject to human rights violations, including forced disappearance, detention,
and torture.43 This allegation was based upon statements by Jeppesen
employees regarding the company's knowledge of the purpose of the flights"
and the company's self-proclaimed expertise in international affairs.45
The complaint stated two causes of action pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS). 46  Initially, the plaintiffs alleged their extraordinary renditions
constituted forced disappearances in violation of a " 'specific, universal and
obligatory' norm of customary international law cognizable under the
[ATS]." '47 The plaintiffs alleged "[t]he very nature and purpose of the
43 Id. paras. 16, 56, 252.
" See Mayer, supra note 4, at 34 (quoting Bob Overby, the managing director of Jeppesen
International Trip Planning, as stating, "We do all of the extraordinary rendition flights-you
know, the torture flights. Let's face it, some of these flights end up that way.").
45 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 16, 56. Jeppesen Sanderson offers "[g]eopolitical
[m]onitoring," which it defines as "[flull background on the political state of affairs in
destination countries... [and] [iun-country connections [to] ensure reliable security precautions
and arrangements." Jeppesen International Trip Planning, http://www.jeppesen.com/download/
misc/BA-I-ITPS-l-10 05.pdf (last visited May 26, 2009). Jeppesen also claims to "know the
world" by offering "an unparalleled network of local handlers and knowledgeable staff who
know the area and their business" and maintaining "cooperative relationships with virtually
every government in the world." Id.; Jeppesen, About Us, http://cfs.jeppesen.com/public/conte
nt.jsp?id=aboutUS (last visited May 26, 2009).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (providing that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States").
"7 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 253; see also International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, arts. 3-4, 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 24(5)(a)-(d),
E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP. l/REV.4 (Dec. 20, 2006) (requiring states to investigate alleged acts
of forced disappearance, provide for the punishment of such acts in their national criminal codes,
prohibit secret detention, guarantee access to information regarding detainees to relatives,
provide representatives and legal counsel, and grant victims of forced disappearance adequate
reparation, including: restitution, rehabilitation, restoration of dignity and reputation, and
guarantees of non-repetition); Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons,
arts. 1, 8, 10, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529 (requiring states to "undertake [n]ot to practice,
permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons" under any circumstances, to provide for
the punishment of such acts in their national criminal codes, to hold detainees in an "officially
recognized place of detention," and to account for all such persons to family members);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c) (1987)
(providing that "[a] state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages or condones.., the disappearance of individuals"). The International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance had been signed by only eighty-
one states at the time of the preparation of this Article, and the United States has refused to sign
the Convention. The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons lacks
universal support as evidenced by its ratification by less than half of the members of the Inter-
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extraordinary rendition program-to forcibly abduct individuals in secret and
to place them beyond the rule of law-constitutes forced disappearance. '
The plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen conspired with U.S. agents and aided,
abetted, and provided practical assistance to U.S. and foreign agents in
subjecting them to forced disappearance.49
The second cause of action alleged that the plaintiffs' extraordinary
renditions had resulted in torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.5 The plaintiffs alleged that this treatment violated customary
American human rights system and is not obligatory given the absence of ratification by the
United States. See Department of International Law, Organization of American States, Status
of Ratification of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, http://
www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-60.html (last visited May 26, 2009) (noting that the
Convention has been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
4' Complaint, supra note 1, para. 254. The International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance defines forced disappearance as
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
[committed] by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such a person
outside the protection of the law.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, supra
note 47, art. 2.
By contrast, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons defines
forced disappearance as
the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever
way, perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed
by an absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby
impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural
guarantees.
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 47, art. 2.
4 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 255-56.
50 While detained in Morocco, Mohamed claimed to have been beaten; mutilated with a
scalpel; threatened with rape, electrocution, and death; subjected to loud music; and placed in
a damp room with an open sewage. Id. paras. 70-71; see also Parliamentary Rendition Report,
supra note 10, para. 206. Mohamed claimed to have been beaten; chained to the floor; hung
from a pole; kept in near-permanent darkness; subjected to loud music, forced stress positions,
and sleep and sensory deprivation; and denied adequate quantities of food and water while
incarcerated in Afghanistan. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 77-80; see also Parliamentary
Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 210. Britel claimed to have been beaten, subjected to
sleep and sensory deprivation, and denied adequate quantities of food and water while
incarcerated in Morocco. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 104-07. Agiza claimed to have been
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international law.51 According to the plaintiffs, the" 'specific, universal, and
obligatory' norm" prohibiting torture also includes the removal of any person
to a state where there is a "substantial likelihood" of torture.52 Jeppesen's
conspiratorial acts, aiding, abetting, and provision of practical assistance to
U.S. and foreign agents in subjecting the plaintiffs to extraordinary rendition
were alleged to have resulted in their subsequent torture. 3
Both causes of action alleged Jeppesen's actions demonstrated reckless
disregard as to whether the plaintiffs would be subjected to forced
disappearance, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 4
According to the plaintiffs, Jeppesen knew or reasonably should have known
its flight and logistical support services would be used in the extraordinary
placed in solitary confinement, shackled, blindfolded, beaten, and subjected to electric shock
while in custody in Egypt. Id. paras. 140-47; see also Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. Comm. Against
Torture, para. 2.6, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 20, 2005). Bashmilah claimed to
have been subject to sleep deprivation and loud music and was shackled to his cell wall during
his detention in Afghanistan, and to sensory manipulation through use of white noise and loud
music while in detention in Eastern Europe. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 163-70, 180. Al-
Rawi alleged that he was shackled; beaten; dragged on the floor; deprived of access to the toilet,
clean clothes, and adequate blankets; subjected to sleep deprivation and loud music; and
threatened with death or transfer to another state for additional torture during his detention in
Afghanistan. Id. paras. 216-17, 222; see also Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10,
para. 173.
"I Complaint, supra note 1, para. 260; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 2, 4, 12-15, opened for signature,
Feb. 4, 1985, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]
(requiring states to adopt "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture," provide for the punishment of such acts in their national criminal codes,
investigate claims of torture in a prompt and impartial manner, grant victims of torture "redress"
and "fair and adequate compensation," and prohibit the use of statements procured through
torture as evidence in any proceedings); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 47, § 702(d) ("A state violates international law if, as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones... torture or other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment.").
2 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 260; see also Convention Against Torture, supra note 5 1,
art. 3 (prohibiting expulsion, return, or extradition of any person to another state where there are
"substantial grounds" for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture
based upon consideration of all "relevant considerations including.., the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights"); Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2822 (codified
as a note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231) (prohibiting the expulsion, extradition, or other involuntary return
of any person to a country in which there are "substantial grounds for believing the person would
be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present
in the United States").
13 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 262-63.
14 Id. paras. 257, 264.
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rendition program to transport plaintiffs to locations where they would be
subjected to such human rights violations."s Jeppesen's "deliberate, willful,
intentional, wanton, malicious, and oppressive" acts and omissions caused the
plaintiffs to suffer physical, mental, and emotional injuries and supported
awards of compensatory and punitive damages.
5 6
B. The District Court and Court of Appeals' Opinions
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the
complaint on February 13, 2008.57 After granting the United States' motion to
intervene" and concluding that it met the procedural requirements for invoking
the state secrets privilege,59 the district court briefly addressed the merits of the
55 Id.
56 Id. paras. 258-59, 265-66.
57 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
5 Id, at 1132-33. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides that federal courts must
permit intervention upon timely motion by anyone who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. •
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Federal courts have distilled this rule into a four-part test for intervention
as a matter of right. Specifically, the movant must: (1) timely submit an application for
intervention, (2) have a "significantly protectable" interest in the subject matter of the litigation,
(3) demonstrate that disposition of the litigation in the absence of the non-party would
significantly impair its ability to protect that interest, and (4) demonstrate that its interests are
not represented by existing parties to the litigation. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court concluded the United States met
the four requirements for intervention as a matter of right as its application to intervene was
timely, was accompanied by a statement demonstrating a "significantly protectable" interest
arising from the activities of the CIA with respect to the extraordinary rendition program,
litigation in the absence of the United States could harm this interest, and its interest was not
adequately protected by Jeppesen as the right to prohibit disclosures relating to the program
belonged exclusively to the United States. Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
" Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34. There are two procedural requirements for a valid
exercise of the state secrets privilege. First, the privilege must be asserted by the head of an
executive branch agency with control over the secrets at issue. United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953). This requirement recognizes the privilege belongs exclusively to the U.S.
government and "can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party." Id at 7. Second, the
head of the agency must personally consider the matter prior to assertion of the privilege. Id.
at 8. These requirements were satisfied in Mohamed through the public declaration of General
Hayden who invoked the privilege in his capacity as Director of the CIA. Mohamed, 539 F.
Supp. 2d at 1134.
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privilege in the context of the extraordinary rendition program. The court
concluded that the allegations regarding the program in the complaint
implicated national security interests, thereby preventing further disclosure.'
The court held that it was required to defer to the executive branch with respect
to assertion of the privilege once national security interests were implicated.6
Proper invocation of the state secrets privilege raised the issue of its impact
upon the litigation. The court concluded that the subject matter of the
complaint was a state secret and thus dismissal was warranted.62 This
conclusion was based upon public and classified declarations of then-CIA
Director, General Michael Hayden. In his public declaration, General Hayden
stated that permitting the complaint to proceed would "cause exponentially
grave damage to... national security by disclosing whether or not the CIA
utilizes particular sources and methods and thus, reveal to foreign adversaries
information about the CIA's intelligence capabilities or lack thereof." 3 The
complaint also raised the issue of "whether or not the CIA cooperated with
particular foreign governments in the conduct of the clandestine intelligence
activities[,]. .. [the confirmation of which] would result in extremely grave
damage to the foreign relations and foreign activities of the United States."'6
The court's review of these public statements and General Hayden's classified
declaration caused it to "have concern that any further proceedings in this case
would elicit facts which might tend to confirm or refute as of yet undisclosed
state secrets."65  Thus, the court deemed the plaintiffs' claims to be non-
justiciable and dismissed the complaint.'
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court on April 29, 2009.67 The court initially concluded that the bar to
litigation set forth in Totten v. United States was not applicable to the
complaint. The court first concluded that the plaintiffs' theories did not require
proof of the operation of the extraordinary rendition program by the CIA or
o Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
61 Id. (citing AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007)).
62 Id. (citing Al-Haramain Islamic Found, 507 F.3d at 1200; Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)). The court refused to address other circumstances warranting
dismissal, specifically, whether invocation of the privilege deprived the plaintiff of evidence to
prove a prima facie case or prevented the defendant from utilizing information in order to raise
a valid defense.
63 Id. at 1135.
4Id.
65 Id. at 1136.
' Id. The court refused to determine the issues of the plaintiffs' standing and their
entitlement to recovery pursuant to the ATS.
67 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009).
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that Jeppesen entered into an agreement to assist in the execution of such
program.6' Rather, the plaintiffs' claims only required proof that Jeppesen
provided assistance for extraordinary rendition flights with actual or imputed
knowledge that the passengers would be subjected to torture.69 Second, the
court concluded that Totten was only applicable when the plaintiffs were
parties to the agreement alleged to be secret. 70 As the plaintiffs were not parties
to any agreement between the CIA and Jeppesen with respect to their rendition,
the bar imposed by Totten was inapplicable.7'
Although acknowledging the judiciary's duty to avoid constitutional
confrontations between the executive and judicial branches whenever possible,
the court rejected application of the "winner-takes-all" formulation set forth in
Totten in favor of the "formula of compromise" set forth in Reynolds v. United
States.72  Applying Reynolds, the court was required to balance " 'the
circumstances of the case' "and the plaintiff's 'showing of necessity' for the
evidence against the 'danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.' ,7
This balance requires recognition that the executive's national security
concerns are only one of many constitutional values at stake.74 Other
constitutional values at stake include prohibitions upon arbitrary imprisonment
and torture, which the court characterized as "gross and notorious ... act[s] of
despotism., 75  The framework set forth in Reynolds accommodated
constitutional concerns without immunizing the CIA or Jeppesen from judicial
scrutiny as required by Totten.76 Thus, the court concluded that "if a lawsuit
is not predicated on a secret agreement between the plaintiff and the
government, Totten does not apply, and the subject matter of the suit is not a
state secret.,
77
68 Id. at 1001.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1002 n.4.
7' Id. at 1002 ("Totten's logic simply cannot stretch to encompass cases brought by third-
party plaintiffs against alleged government contractors for the contractors' alleged involvement
in tortious intelligence activities."). The court further concluded that the holding in Totten was
limited to the specific factual context of the case, and there was no support for its expansion
within applicable U.S. Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedence. Id.
7 Id. at 1003.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1003-04.




RENDITION AND STATE SECRETS
Application of the holding in Reynolds to the complaint did not
automatically mandate pretrial dismissal. Rather, according to the court, the
state secrets privilege applied to evidence rather than information.7" The state
secrets privilege should not be applied in a manner as to prevent parties from
litigating the truth or falsity of specific factual allegations.79 Rather, the
privilege only prevented the introduction of evidence deemed to be secret to
prove a disputed fact. ° Evidence may be shielded from disclosure if it contains
secret information, but the privilege only protects disclosure of the document
or communication and not the underlying fact itself as long as it may be proven
without resort to privileged materials."' Thus, dismissal of a complaint is
appropriate only if "specific privileged evidence is itself indispensable to
establishing either the truth of the plaintiff's allegations or a valid defense that
would otherwise be available to the defendant.,
8 2
At this juncture in the litigation, the court held that it could not determine
the applicability of the state secrets privilege without an actual request for
information and accompanying explanation of necessity of such evidence from
the plaintiffs and a formal invocation of the privilege by the government.83 The
court further concluded that it could not ascertain the existence of non-
privileged information that could prove the plaintiffs' allegations nor whether
the absence of privileged material from consideration deprived Jeppesen of
access to a meritorious defense.' On remand, the district court was instructed
to dismiss the complaint only if privileged evidence was indispensable to either
party.8
5
IV. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
A. Overview of the State Secrets Privilege
The state secrets privilege is a "common law evidentiary rule that protects
information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to the national
78 Id. at 1004-05.
79 Id. at 1005.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1006.
83 Id. at 1008-09.
8 Id.
85 Id at 1009.
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security. '86  Protected information includes that which would result in
"impairment of the nation's defense capabilities, disclosure of intelligence-
gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of diplomatic relations with
foreign governments."87 Despite its common law origin, the privilege has
constitutional underpinnings to the extent it derives from the "President's
constitutional authority over the conduct of [the] country's diplomatic and
military affairs."8 The privilege's U.S. origin has been attributed to Chief
Justice Marshall in his 1807 opinion relating to Aaron Buff's trial for treason.89
86 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Monarch
Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (referring to the "common-
law state secrets privilege"); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing
the privilege as "a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny
discovery of military secrets"); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(describing the privilege as "a common law evidentiary rule").
87 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. 1983); see also In re Under Seal, 945
F.2d 1285, 1287 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991).
88 EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aft'd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (stating that the privilege
has "constitutional overtones which we find it unnecessary to pass upon"); EI-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 303-04 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the privilege was "developed at
common law" but also has a "firm foundation in the Constitution"); Robert M. Chesney, State
Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249, 1309-10
(2007) (describing the privilege as having a "constitutional core surrounded by a revisable
common-law shell"). The constitutional underpinnings of the state secrets privilege were
perhaps best summarized as follows:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports neither are
nor ought to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.
Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). Butsee Amanda Frost,
The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1931, 1934 (2007)
(concluding that federal courts should review the adequacy of congressional oversight of the
executive branch prior to application ofjusticiability doctrines that may lead to the dismissal of
litigation such as the state secrets privilege). According to Frost, federal courts should decline
to apply such doctrines and should exercise jurisdiction as Congress has not adequately
exercised its oversight authority. Id. at 1962.
89 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692A). Although Chief
Justice Marshall permitted the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum requested by Burr for
correspondence addressed to President Thomas Jefferson, Marshall noted that if the letter
"contain[ed] any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the
executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the
point, will, of course, be suppressed." Id. at 37; see also SIMON GREENLEAF & JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, ATREATISEONTHE LAWOFEVIDENCE, § 251 n.5 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 16th
ed. 1899) (tracing the recognition of the state secrets privilege to Justice Marshall's opinion in
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The modem statement of the privilege is set forth in the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds." In denying the plaintiff's access
to the U.S. Air Force's official accident investigation report and statements of
surviving crew members arising from the crash of a B-29 aircraft, the Court
recognized that certain information could be shielded from disclosure if the
government's explanation of why the information would jeopardize national
security outweighed the claim of necessity asserted by the party seeking
discovery.9' The privilege was validly asserted when a court was satisfied
"from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest
of national security, should not be divulged."'92 The Court acknowledged that
this determination required a "formula of compromise" as judicial control over
evidentiary matters could be subject to the caprice of the executive branch, but
judges could not determine the appropriateness of the claim of privilege by
compelling disclosure of "the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
93
Thus, despite its compromissary nature, the privilege is of the "highest dignity
and significance,"'  and courts are to give the "utmost deference" to its
invocation.95
The Court in Reynolds conditioned valid exercise of the state secrets
privilege on three requirements. First, the privilege must be asserted by the
head of an executive branch agency with control over the secrets at issue.96
Second, the head of the agency must personally consider the matter prior to
assertion of the privilege.97 Finally, the information sought to be protected
from disclosure must be a state secret.98 This determination requires
United States v. Burr).
9 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1.
9' Id. at 2, 3, 11.
92 Id. at 10.
93 Id. at 9-10.
EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 (E.D. Va. 2006), affd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007).
" United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (holding presidential claims of privilege
for military and diplomatic secrets are "traditionally shown the utmost deference"); see also El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007); Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
9 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8; see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304. This requirement
recognizes the privilege belongs exclusively to the federal government and "can neither be
claimed nor waived by a private party." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
9' Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8; see also EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304.
98 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8; see also Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 986; El-Masri, 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 536.
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independent and careful judicial consideration regarding whether the
information is deserving of the protection offered by the privilege as well as the
consequences of disclosure.99 The information need not be secret or of
significant importance in and of itself in order to qualify as a state secret.
Rather, courts have held that even "seemingly innocuous information" is
privileged if that information is part of a classified "mosaic" that "can be
analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen
whole must operate."' °
The centrality of the information to the case is also of considerable
importance.'' Judicial inquiry regarding information periplieral to the case
need not be as searching as circumstances where the information sought to be
protected is at the core of the litigation."' Nevertheless, the "most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake."'0 3 The balance is further slanted in
favor of recognition of the privilege and non-disclosure given the utmost
deference owed by courts to the Executive Branch's assertion of secrecy and
its authority with respect to military and diplomatic matters." As a result, the
judiciary must accept the Executive Branch's invocation of the privilege if
there is a "reasonable danger" that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged."'' 5
The intervening fifty-six years since Reynolds has seen four primary
developments in state secrets privilege jurisprudence. The first development
is the expansion of the privilege to shield materials negatively impacting U.S.
99 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9 (holding that the court must consider whether "a responsive
answer... or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result" (citing Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951))); see
also El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (stating that the focus of the inquiry is "whether the
United States has made an adequate showing that disclosure of claimed privileged material
would injure national security").
10 Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
The so-called "mosaic theory" has been subject to criticism due to its susceptibility to
government misuse, its lack of any limiting principle, and its potential shielding of non-
privileged information. See S. REP. No. 110-442, at 25-26 (2008).
0' AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
dismissal is appropriate when "the very subject matter of a lawsuit is a matter of state secret").
102 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
103 Halkin, 598 F.2d at 14; see also Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
104 AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 507 F.3d at 1203 (holding that courts must defer to the
executive branch on foreign policy and national security matters).
"~s United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); see also Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37.
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foreign relations.'06 The second development has been increasing divergence
among courts with respect to the degree of judicial deference to the Executive
Branch's invocation of the privilege.'0 7 A related development is whether
courts should adopt procedures by which to test government claims of state
secrets and, if so, what tools should be utilized."0 ' Finally, the privilege has
been invoked in an increasing number, if not type, of cases.'" These
106 See, e.g., EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
107 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (information may be
withheld when disclosure would be "inimical to the national security"); Zuckerbraun v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1991) (information may be withheld when
disclosure would "jeopardize national security"); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (information may be withheld when disclosure would "adversely affect national
security").
118 The creation of methods by which to determine whether the privilege has been properly
invoked is based upon the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's encouragement
of "procedural innovation" in addressing state secrets issues. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64.
Procedures adopted by courts to test invocations of the privilege include in camera hearings and
bench trials, appointments of special masters, protective orders, redaction of names, and use of
sealed testimony. See, e.g., In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing
the use of sealed testimony and protective orders); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472,478 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (discussing the use of redaction of names and bench trials); Loral Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1133 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring the case to a special master where
dismissal was sought on the basis of the state secrets privilege); Halpem v. United States, 258
F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1958) (ordering an in camera trial as long as it could be conducted
"without running any serious risk of divulgence of military secrets"); AI-Haramain Islamic
Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1233 (D. Or. 2006) (suggesting the appointment of a
national security expert as a special master to assess the impact of disclosure of the alleged
secrets), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007), remanded to 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (discussing the appointment of an expert to assist
the court with state secrecy issues). However, it bears to note that while creating procedures by
which courts may determine whether the state secrets privilege has been properly invoked in a
specific case, these opinions do not adequately address the far more difficult issue of how to
protect state secrets at trial should the.case survive dismissal.
,09 There were four reported cases concerning invocation of the state secrets privilege
between 1953 and 1976. See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and
Executive Power, 120 POL. Sci. Q. 85, 101 (2005). This number grew to fifty-one cases
between 1977 and 2001. Id. The Bush administration reportedly invoked the state secrets
privilege on forty-five occasions between 2001 and 2007. See OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG,
SECRECY REPORT CARD 2008: INDICATORS OF SECRECY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20
(2007), http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SecrecyReportCard08.pdf. The increasing
invocation of the privilege has been subject to criticism by commentators. See, e.g., Carrie
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Government
Misuse, 1 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 132 (2007) (characterizing the increased use of the
privilege as "deviations from Reynolds [that are] ... interfering with the opportunity to pursue
claims of violations ofprivate and public constitutional rights"); John Cary Sims, Ten Questions:
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invocations have increasingly sought dismissal of pending litigation rather than
limitations upon discovery or other methods by which to shield information
from public disclosure.110
B. The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate Complicity in Extraordinary
Rendition
It is clear that the extraordinary rendition program is a state secret and is
subject to nondisclosure. The complaint alleges the existence of a clandestine
U.S. intelligence program involving the apparent cooperation of foreign
intelligence services and law enforcement authorities throughout the world.
The complaint not only discloses the existence of this program but also the
operational means and methods utilized by the United States and its co-
participants. Any further disclosures regarding the program would reveal the
means and methods utilized to seize suspected terrorists by the United States
and its allies to an undesirable degree.
These concerns stretch beyond merely answering the complaint. Rather, the
plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims without demonstrating the underlying
Responses of John Cary Sims, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1593, 1597 (2007) (contending that
the expanded use of the state secrets privilege has "broken from the doctrinal moorings" of
Reynolds and "has been expanded beyond all reason"). But see Chesney, supra note 88, at 1249
(concluding that "the quantitative inquiry serves little purpose in light of variation in the number
of occasions for potential invocation of the privilege from year to year").
I10 See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2005) (dismissing claims seeking enforcement
of an espionage contract with the CIA); Black V. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1116-20 (8th
Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of claims at the pleadings stage); Bowles v. United States, 950
F.2d 154, 155 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of claims at the pleadings stage relating to an
automobile accident involving a government-owned vehicle operated by a government
employee); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 545 (dismissing claims at the pleadings stage); Fitzgerald
v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing a libel action at
the pleadings stage); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (dismissing claims at the pleadings stage); Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F.
Supp. 2d 623,624,626-27 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing a gender discrimination lawsuit brought
against CIA at the pleadings stage); Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753-54, 756 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (dismissing claims at the pleadings stage). The increasing use of the privilege as a
basis for dismissal of claims at the pleadings stage has been subject to criticism by
commentators. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 88, at 1939-40 (criticizing the use of the privilege
to dismiss litigation at the pleadings stage based upon past invocations of the privilege to limit
discovery); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 134 (2006) (noting the increased use of "potent
litigation tactics" such as motions to dismiss based upon the state secrets privilege); Simssupra
note 109, at 1598 (describing the privilege as "quickly becoming an additional and almost-
impermeable immunity doctrine").
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acts in which Jeppesen is claimed to have conspired, aided, abetted, and
participated. The plaintiffs will thus be required to prove the existence and
operation of the extraordinary rendition program for purposes of proving
Jeppesen's complicity. The means of procuring this proof and presenting it to
a jury in federal court will create further difficulties in the discovery and trial
phases of the litigation should the claims be permitted to proceed. The
disclosures that will be necessary in these stages will also further compromise
the operation of the rendition program to an extent that may ultimately cause
its abandonment by the United States or jeopardize further cooperation by
foreign law enforcement and intelligence services.
The possibility of compulsion of disclosures regarding the extraordinary
rendition program presents a reasonable danger of interference with the
President's responsibility for national security and authority over foreign
affairs. The continued viability of anti-terrorism programs is essential to the
preservation of national security, a responsibility clearly within the President's
constitutional obligations. This obligation includes authority to protect
national security information."'
In this case, such information would include operational details associated
with the rendition flights serviced by Jeppesen. This information is essential
for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs would be required to prove the underlying
human rights violations engaged in by the CIA. Such information is necessary
as the plaintiffs cannot prove Jeppesen's complicity in human rights abuses
without proving the underlying violations themselves. Proof of the underlying
violations may require disclosure of the policies and practices underlying
extraordinary rendition, including the number and identity of participants in
rendition operations, the identity of their employer, the extent of CIA
participation, and other operational details which have not been publicly
disclosed.
The second element of the plaintiffs' claims requires proof of Jeppesen's
complicity as a conspirator, aider, abettor, or participant." 2 The information
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (stating that "authority to protect
[national security] information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as
Commander in Chief'). National security information is broadly defined and clearly
encompasses intelligence gathering, the activities of the CIA, and clandestine operations
involving foreign states. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)
(concluding that "[glathering intelligence information and the other activities of the [CIA],
including clandestine affairs against other nations, are all within the President's constitutional
responsibility for the security of the Nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief
of our Armed Forces").
112 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(quoting then-CIA Director Hayden who stated that the complaint "puts at issue whether or not
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required to prove this element is even more troubling given the comprehensive
nature of the assistance allegedly provided by Jeppesen. Access to this
information is necessary given the enhanced degree of specificity required by
claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting, as well claims asserted pursuant
to the ATS."' Access to this information is also essential given the serious
nature of the allegations and their potential to cause considerable financial
injury to Jeppesen through awards of damages and harm to corporate
reputation.
When combined with the information required to prove the underlying
human rights violations, information concerning Jeppesen's role creates a
virtual extraordinary rendition playbook. The creation of such a playbook
presents a reasonable danger of exposure of national intelligence-gathering
methods and capabilities consistent with invocation of the state secrets
privilege. The required publication of details of the extraordinary rendition
program necessitated by the complaint by a branch of the government ill-suited
to evaluate the consequences of the release of sensitive information can only
weaken any course of action selected by the Executive Branch in furtherance
of its national security obligations.
The possibility of compelling disclosures regarding the extraordinary
rendition program also presents a "reasonable danger" of further disruption of
diplomatic relations."4 As noted by General Hayden, the complaint raises the
issue of "whether or not the CIA cooperated with particular foreign
governments in the conduct of alleged clandestine intelligence activities... [,]
[the confirmation of which] would result in extremely grave damage to the
foreign relations and foreign activities of the United States.'115  This
cooperation has proven controversial. The program has already resulted in
investigations by foreign governments with several more pending."6 Further
Jeppesen assisted the CIA with any of the alleged detention and interrogation[,] . . . [the
disclosure of which] would cause exponentially grave damage to... national security").
"3 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (detailing the specificity
requirement for complaints filed pursuant to the ATS); Lemer v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting the specificity requirement for complaints alleging aiding and abetting);
Mass v. McClenahan, 893 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (asserting the specificity requirement
for complaints alleging conspiracies to violate civil rights).
"4 See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding the state secret
privilege may be properly asserted in instances where disclosure would disrupt diplomatic
relations with foreign governments).
H Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
16 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMrrTEE, RENDITION, supra note 9, at 13, 49, 67 (noting that the extraordinary rendition
program has created "ethical dilemmas with our closest ally," has demonstrated that the United
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strain has been placed on U.S. relations with European states as a result of the
Council of Europe's investigation of the complicity of numerous national
governments in extraordinary renditions." 7 The impact on relations with
European states is significant and includes some of the United States' closest
allies in the so-called "War on Terror" such as Italy, Poland, Spain, and the
United Kingdom." 8
However, the impact of further disclosures regarding the extraordinary
rendition program extends beyond Europe. Diplomatic relations with other
states that permitted extraordinary renditions to occur within their territory may
be negatively impacted. This group of states includes numerous crucial allies
in U.S. antiterrorism efforts, such as Canada, Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Turkey." 9 Diplomatic relations with foreign states that accepted persons
States will take "whatever action it deems necessary" despite protests by the United Kingdom,
and has shown a "lack of regard" for the United Kingdom's concerns). In Germany, prosecutors
issued arrest warrants for thirteen suspected CIA agents, and the Bundestag created a committee
and appointed a special investigator to determine whether extraordinary renditions occurred in
German airspace and the degree of knowledge of such renditions by German authorities. See
Untersuchungsauftrag [Mandate for the Committee of Inquiry], July 6, 2007 (F.R.G.), available
at http://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/ua/l-ua/auftrag/auftrag-erweitereng.pdf (creating the
Committee of Inquiry and appointing a special investigator); see also Mark Landler, German
Court Challenges C.I.A. over Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at Al (discussing the
issuance of arrest warrants for CIA operatives allegedly involved in the extraordinary rendition
of German citizen Khalid El-Masri). Criminal investigations also were commenced in Canada,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. See COMM'N OF
INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT
OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006); Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra
note 10, paras. 237, 244 (discussing ongoing criminal investigations in Italy and Spain); IRISH
HUMAN RTS. COMM'N, "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION": A REVIEW OF IRELAND'S HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS (2007), available at http://www.ihrc.ie/_fileupload/publications/IHRCRe
ndition ReportFINAL.pdf; REQUEST FOR AN EXPLANATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 52
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPLY FROM NORWAY (Feb. 20, 2006),
available at http://coe/int/t/dc/files/events/2006_cia/Norway.pdf; Balz Bruppacher, Swiss
Suspend CIA Abduction Probe, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 18,2008, available at http://www.foxne
ws.com/wires/2008Jan18/0,2670,SwitzerlandClAFlights,00.html; France Investigates CIA
Flight Stopover Claims, ABC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 3,2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsite
ms/200512/s1522862.htm (discussing reports by French Newspaper Le Figaro reports that two
flights charted by the CIA made stops in France); Denmark to Investigate Alleged CIA Flights,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at 10; Portugal Probes Alleged CIA Flights, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 5,2007, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007
020501454.html.
II' See, e.g., EUR. PARL. ASS., supra note 16; Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10;
Venice Comm'n, supra note 9.
18 See Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, paras. 43, 288-89.
..9 Id. paras. 230, 288.
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subject to rendition and subsequently utilized detention and interrogation
methods that do not comport with U.S. law or international standards may also
be affected. States within this category include Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Romania, Thailand, and
Uzbekistan. 20 The vast majority of these states are key participants in
combating terrorism on the basis of their own struggles against terrorist
organizations.
Further disclosures regarding the extent of national cooperation or
indifference to extraordinary renditions occurring within these states' territories
will at the very least embarrass some national governments. Western European
states may suffer embarrassment for their failure to uphold human rights
protections deeply engrained in their national cultures as well as in regional and
global instruments. Other governments may be reluctant to confirm their
cooperation with U.S. intelligence forces in extraordinary rendition for other
reasons, including previous denials of such cooperation, the maintenance of
standing in the international community, concerns about abdication of national
sovereignty, and potential inflammation of opposition within their
constituencies. Governments particularly susceptible in this regard include
states with populations deeply skeptical of U.S. foreign policy in general and
antiterrorism initiatives in particular such as Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan,
and Turkey. Some of these governments may suffer far greater consequences,
including destabilization, increased radicalization of populations, and
consequent re-evaluation of further operations with U.S. intelligence services.
As a result, continuing cooperation in confronting terrorism may suffer. 2 '
Such a result is not only inimical to present U.S. foreign policy goals and future
initiatives, but it also undermines the international consensus necessary to
20 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 30, 37; see also AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 17, at 1, 3;
Parliamentary Rendition Report, supra note 10, para. 289.
"2' See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMIsSION REPORT 379 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91 1/reportl911 Repo
rt.pdf (stating that "[p]ractically every aspect of U.S. counterterrorism strategy relies on
international cooperation"); Raymond Bonner, British Report Reproaches US. on Abductions,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 27, 2007, available at 2007 WL 14525403 (alleging that the United
Kingdom has refused to cooperate in some covert operations with the CIA as a result of its
inability to obtain assurances that they would not result in extraordinary rendition and inhuman
treatment); Pamela Hess, CIA Chief Defends Detention of Terrorism Suspects, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 7,2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/07/america/NA-GEN-
US-CIA-Detainees.php (quoting former CIA Director Hayden as criticizing media reports
regarding extraordinary rendition on the basis that they have "cost us several promising
counterterrorism and counterproliferation assets" due to fear of public exposure).
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successfully combat the spread of global terrorism.22 The "reasonable
danger" presented by these possible impacts upon U.S. foreign relations
compels imposition of the state secrets privilege, preventing further disclosures
regarding the extraordinary rendition program necessitated by adjudication of
the claims stated by the complaint. Although the program in general and
specific renditions in particular may be the focus of continued speculation by
the international and national media, such speculation "simply does not pose
the same threat to national security and foreign relations as do . . . judicial
findings by a federal court.'
123
Once determined to be secret and present a "reasonable danger" of negative
impact upon national security and foreign relations, details of the extraordinary
rendition program are protected from disclosure without further judicial
inquiry. This result is mandated by the difference between the state secrets
privilege and other evidentiary privileges. Unlike other privileges which are
not to be "lightly created nor expansively construed" due to their impact "in
derogation of the search for the truth,' ' 24 the state secrets privilege is absolute
once it has been invoked and properly established.125 Judicial balancing of the
various interests at stake, including a particular party's need for the
information, is not appropriate.'26 Rather, the perceived need for the privileged
122 See ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING
TERRORISM 19 (2006) (stating that "[s]ince September 11, most of our important successes
against AI-Qaida and other terrorist organizations have been made possible through effective
partnerships. Continued success depends on the actions of a powerful coalition of nations
maintaining a united front against terror.").
12 Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 23, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2008).
124 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493
U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (holding that "[i]nasmuch as 'testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges
contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man's evidence,'
any such privilege must 'be strictly construed' " (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980))).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9 (1953) (holding that once it is
established, "the claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further disclosure");
AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that "[o]nce
properly invoked and judicially blessed, the state secrets privilege is not a half-way
proposition"); In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1288 (4th Cir. 1991) (providing that "the
privilege is absolute when properly invoked"); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (holding "secrets of state - matters the revelation of which reasonably could be seen
as a threat to the military or diplomatic interests of the nation - are absolutely privileged from
disclosure in the courts"); EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006),
aff'd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting "unlike other privileges, the state secrets privilege
is absolute").
126 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
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information "affects only the depth of the judicial inquiry into the validity of
the assertion and not the strength of the privilege itself."'' 27 Thus, even the most
compelling need demonstrated by the plaintiffs for the details of the
extraordinary rendition program in the prosecution of the complaint against
Jeppesen cannot overcome the national security and foreign relations interests
protected by the privilege. 28 The strength of the plaintiffs' claims and the
disturbing nature of the behavior alleged in the complaint are equally irrelevant
to the application of the privilege. 1
29
It further bears to note that the ability of the Executive Branch to shield
information from disclosure is much broader in civil cases. 130 The rationale for
the distinction between civil and criminal cases was set forth in Reynolds
wherein the Supreme Court concluded the state secrets privilege may be
narrower in criminal prosecutions as it would be unconscionable to allow the
government to undertake a prosecution and then invoke the privilege to deprive
the defendant of material information.'13 This rationale has no application in
civil cases where the plaintiff is responsible for the initiation of the litigation
and thus accepts evidentiary limitations, including privileges, as dictated by
applicable procedural rules. Thus, although a court might limit the state secrets
privilege in any criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs for terrorist activities, it
"no attempt is made to balance the need for secrecy of the privileged information against a
party's need for the information's disclosure; a court's determination that a piece of evidence
is a privileged state secret removes it from the proceedings entirely"); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d
at 537 (holding that "the privilege is not subject to a judicial balancing of the various interests
at stake").
127 See, e.g., EI-Masri, 437 F. Supp. at 537.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., id. at 539 n. 12 (concluding "the strength or weakness of [the plaintiff's] legal
claims is immaterial to the resolution of the state secrets privilege"). But see Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding dismissal of a complaint involving
claims of illegal wiretapping pursuant to the state secrets privilege was inappropriate as the
alleged state secret involved "ongoing, widespread violations of individual constitutional
rights... [rather than] a covert espionage relationship"). However, the holding in Hepting is
distinguishable on the basis that it is applicable solely to widespread claims of violations of
constitutional rights (such as the right of privacy pursuant to the Fourth Amendment) rather than
human rights violations asserted pursuant to the ATS. The violations alleged in the complaint
were not widespread but were directed at a readily identifiable and small group of people, and
the relationship between the CIA and Jeppesen may constitute a "covert espionage relationship"
within the parameters of the privilege as defined by the Hepting court.
130 EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313 n.7 (stating "[iut should be unnecessary for us to point out that
the Executive's authority to protect confidential military and intelligence information is much
broader in civil matters than in criminal prosecutions").
131 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
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should not utilize a similarly narrow definition in determining the applicability
of the privilege to the plaintiffs' civil suit.
Once the privilege is established, the focus then shifts to its effect on the
litigation. This issue is resolved by determining the centrality of the privileged
material to the claims. 13 2 Dismissal is appropriate where the state secrets form
the "very subject matter" of the proceeding.13 The unavailability of
information to the parties as a result of application of the privilege also
necessarily leads to dismissal.'34
Applying these standards, the Ninth Circuit's revival of the complaint was
in error. Although "a bright line does not always separate the subject matter
of the lawsuit from the information necessary to establish a prima facie case,"
extraordinary rendition does not present a close call. 135 The very question upon
which the complaint depends, the operational details of the extraordinary
rendition program, is a state secret. The details of the program are so central
to the subject matter of the complaint that further proceedings will necessitate
further unwelcome disclosures regarding matters subject to the privilege's
protection. In order to prevail on their claims, the plaintiffs will need to
produce admissible evidence that they were detained and interrogated by CIA
operatives, which in turn would require disclosure of how the CIA "organizes,
staffs, and supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations.' 36 In addition
to specifics regarding the manner in which renditions are performed, additional
details subject to disclosure, should the complaint be permitted to proceed,
include the identity of CIA employees who arranged the rendition flights,
communicated with Jeppesen, were aboard such flights, and actually conducted
the renditions. The identities of such individuals, who by necessity would be
witnesses in any effort by the plaintiffs to prove the existence of the program
and Jeppesen's complicity therein, are state secrets. 13 7  These facts and
132 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
3' AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008); see also El-
Masri, 479 F.3d at 306; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
134 See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (concerning disposal of
hazardous waste in a classified operating area); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1116-19
(8th Cir. 1995) (concerning an alleged "campaign of harassment" of the plaintiff by Executive
Branch officials); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992)
(concerning the presence of manufacturing and design defects in a military weapons system);
Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concerning alleged unlawful CIA
surveillance).
135 AI-Haramain Islamic Found, 507 F.3d at 1201.
136 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 309.
37 Id. (concluding the claims challenging extraordinary rendition require the testimony of
CIA employees whose identities are state secrets).
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witnesses are central to the complaint. However, their secret nature prevents
their disclosure and must thus prevent the further prosecution of the plaintiffs'
action. 3'
The Ninth Circuit's opinion makes it more difficult for Jeppesen to defend
the litigation. Dismissal or other summary adjudication is necessary if the
privilege "deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the
defendant a valid defense to the claim."' 9 Jeppesen is now required to file an
answer, a pleading which by operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
must disclose specific details regarding the extraordinary rendition program."4
Furthermore, assuming the plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case,
Jeppesen could not properly defend itself without using privileged information.
Jeppesen's primary defenses are to demonstrate that the plaintiffs were not
subject to disappearance and torture, Jeppesen was not involved in such
conduct, or the nature of its involvement is insufficient to subject it to
liability.' 4 ' Assertion of these defenses would require disclosure of information
previously discussed as essential to the prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims.
' See Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (endorsing pleadings dismissal
of litigation where "sensitive military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the
litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters"); see also
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1197 (endorsing the principle that pleading-stage
dismissals are appropriate when continuation of pending litigation threatens to expose privileged
information); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306, 310 (concluding dismissal is proper where the "central
facts" necessary for prosecution of the action consist of information protected by the state secrets
privilege).
139 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
140 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(l)(A)-(B) (providing that "[a] party must... state in short and
plain terms [the party's] defenses to each claim asserted ... and [shall] admit or deny the
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party").
141 See EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 309 (dismissing the plaintiffs complaint against the CIA
relating to his extraordinary rendition on the basis that the "main avenues" of the U.S.
government's defense were blocked by the state secrets privilege). Although EI-Masri
concerned claims primarily asserted against the United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit did not limit its discussion to government defendants. Rather, perhaps
anticipating the next attempt to litigate the legality of the extraordinary rendition program
through claims directed solely at private parties, the court stated that "[s]imilar concerns would
attach to evidence produced in defense of the corporate defendants and their unnamed
employees." Id. at 310 (dismissing claims against Premier Executive Transport Services and
Aero Contractors, Ltd., which the plaintiffalleged were private charter companies with extensive
histories of providing air transport services to the CIA); see also supra note 3 and accompanying
text. This holding recognizes that the privilege's protection does not change with the identity
of the defendants nor lessen as claims are asserted against defendants with lesser degrees of
involvement in the primary human rights violations, such as conspirators and abettors. Thus,
the revision of litigation strategy in the wake of EI-Masri, as reflected in the complaint, is
inadequate to overcome the bar of the state secrets privilege.
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Other evidence that might necessarily be adduced in Jeppesen's defense
include its contacts with the CIA regarding logistical support for the flights,
information disclosed by the CIA regarding the nature of such flights, a
detailed account of the support provided by Jeppesen for each flight on which
one of the plaintiffs was transported, and the extent to which the flights could
not have occurred without Jeppesen's support. This information, going directly
to the means, methods, and operational details of the extraordinary rendition
program, cannot be disclosed given the reasonable danger presented to national
security and U.S. foreign relations. The unavailability of this information
derives Jeppesen of an adequate defense and mandates dismissal of the
complaint.42
Alternatives to dismissal are inadequate to protect the extraordinary
rendition program from further harmful disclosures. Instead of availing itself
of the drastic remedy of dismissal, the plaintiffs may contend that the court
should employ alternative procedures such as receipt of the evidence alleged
to be state secrets under seal or conducting an in camera trial.'43 However,
these procedures are unnecessary and inadequate to justify a breach of the state
secrets privilege. Additional proceedings are not required before a district
court may consider the application of the privilege to a specific case.'" The
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Reynolds is also instructive in this regard.
Reynolds clearly admonishes courts to refrain from circumvention of the
privilege in its holding that when "the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate ... [,] the court should not jeopardize the security which the
privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence,
even by the judge alone in chambers."'45 Reynolds further precludes the use of
any balancing test between the needs for secrecy and disclosure.'" Rather,
once information is deemed a state secret, the privilege applies absolutely and
the information is removed from the proceedings entirely. "' Courts "are not
142 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310 (concluding dismissal is proper where the "central facts"
necessary for defending against an action is information protected by the state secrets privilege).
143 Id. at 311.
'" See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing the litigation at
the onset as the state secrets privilege barred the plaintiff's prima facie case); see also Al-
Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2007) (deeming immediate
dismissal appropriate even where the very subject matter of the case is not a state secret if the
case cannot be litigated without using or threatening to disclose privileged material).
" United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311.
'46 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
147 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
required to play with fire and chance ... inadvertent, mistaken, or even
intentional [disclosure].'48
In Mohamed, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California conducted an ex parte, in camera review of a classified declaration
by CIA Director Hayden prior to entry of its order dismissing the case on the
basis of the state secrets privilege. 149 This review protected the plaintiffs'
interests to the extent that it ensured the existence of adequate grounds for the
assertion of the privilege while simultaneously safeguarding the public interest
in preserving the confidentiality of information potentially inimical to U.S.
national security and foreign relations. The district court's decision is thus
defensible despite the lack of disclosure to the plaintiffs' counsel of the
information upon which it was based and despite their consequent lack of
appreciation and comprehension of "the substantial harm that could be
reasonably expected to result from litigating this case."'"5
Utilization of these options is further precluded by the nature of the
plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, any ad hoc procedure created by the court
would be ineffective where "the entire aim of the suit is to prove the existence
of state secrets."' 5 ' The claims contained within the complaint cannot be
separated from the state secrets they challenge. Even if some degree of
separation was possible, the proximity of the claims and secrets is such as to
render utilization of any special procedures imprudent.
Additionally, adoption of special procedures would be an inordinate
exercise in judicial creativity without Congressional authorization or adequate
precedent. Such procedures, should they be employed, would create
considerable risk of intentional or inadvertent disclosures inimical to national
security and U.S. foreign policy. Such risks mitigate against the creation of
special accommodations for limited disclosure of state secrets, especially in
civil proceedings where the privilege is far broader.'52
In summary, state secrets case law "strikes an appropriate balance between
civil justice and national security."'53 This balance recognizes manypotentially
148 Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005).
,49 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
'so Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States, supra note 123,
at5.
,sl El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006), af'd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007); see also Sterling, 416 F.2d at 348 (holding special procedures to be inadequate when
the "whole object" of the plaintiff's suit is to establish a state secret (quoting Molerio v. FBI, 749
F.2d 815, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
152 See Sterling, 416 F.3d at 338; see also supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
151 S. REP.No. 110-442, at 39 (2008).
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conflicting interests, including national security and the rights of litigants, the
need for rules governing applicability of the privilege and the need for
flexibility in responding to specific cases, the duty of the Executive Branch to
protect national security, and the mandate of the judicial branch to uphold and
apply the law to individual cases and controversies.'54 Contrary to critics on
both sides of the issue, courts do not lack the competence or ability to evaluate
assertions of the privilege nor have they abdicated their obligation to undertake
such analysis. Judges clearly possess the authority to determine whether
evidence sought to be protected from disclosure is within the privilege.' The
burden of proof regarding the proper assertion of the privilege and its
application within a specific case or controversy remains with the federal
government.'56 Rather, invocation of the state secrets doctrine by federal courts
in the context of civil litigation challenging clandestine government programs
is recognition of the constitutional underpinnings of the common law origin of
the privilege. Specifically, invocation of the privilege by courts recognizes the
constitutional separation of powers and deference to the Executive Branch on
questions of foreign relations and national security.'57 It also demonstrates a
' Id. at 41; see also AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2008) (describing the privilege as placing upon the court "a special burden to assure itself
that an appropriate balance is struck between protecting national security matters and preserving
an open court system").
... United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
156 See, e.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1203-04 (concluding that the
government met its burden with respect to assertion of the privilege by providing "exceptionally
well documented [and] [d]etailed statements" that disclosure of certain information and "the
means, sources and methods of intelligence gathering in the context of this case would
undermine the government's intelligence capabilities and compromise national security"); El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a classified
declaration met the government's burden of proof by setting forth "in detail the nature of the
information that the Executive seeks to protect and explains why its disclosure would be
detrimental to national security").
'3 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found, 507 F.3d at 1203 (the court stated that "[w]e
acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national
security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this
arena" and "judicial intuition ... is no substitute for documented risks and threats posed by the
potential disclosure of national security information"); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305
(granting "utmost deference" to the judgment of the Executive Branch in the area of national
security as it occupies "a position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the consequences
of a release of sensitive information"); S. REP. No. 110-442, at 42-43 (stating that the
constitutional separation of powers is "reflected in the reality that the Executive [B]ranch
department head who asserts the state secrets privilege will have national security expertise,
intelligence, and staff that dwarf that of the [d]istrict [j]udge who reviews that assertion of the
privilege").
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prudent reluctance to "substitute Uudicial intuition] for documented risks and
threats posed by the potential disclosure of national security information." '
Another possibility is invocation of the Classified Information Procedures
Act (CIPA). 5 9 However, application of CIPA is improper in this case for
several reasons. Initially, the same considerations that prevent the use of non-
disclosure agreements and in camera trials are applicable to CIPA, including
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Reynolds, which makes no reference to
nor endorses any similar proceeding. 6 ' Second, CIPA is a criminal statute with
limited applicability. The procedures contained within CIPA relating to the use
of classified information in criminal cases should not be extended to federal
civil litigation without the express consent of the U.S. Congress.
CIPA's criminal focus is also apparent in its definition of "classified
information," which is considerably narrower than the definition of state
secrets. "Classified information" requires an accompanying executive order,
federal statute, or administrative regulation and a relationship between the
information and national security concerns.' 6' By contrast, state secrets require
no such formality and may relate to foreign policy considerations as well as
national security concerns. The breadth of state secrets in comparison to
classified information reflects the broader nature of the state secrets privilege
in civil actions in comparison to CIPA's related concept in criminal actions. 62
Furthermore, although Congress eased restrictions upon the utilization of
classified information in criminal prosecutions pursuant to CIPA, there is no
corresponding urgency to limit restrictions upon the utilization of such
information in civil suits.
The invocation of CIPA also fails due to the differences between the use of
classified information in criminal prosecutions and state secrets in civil actions.
CIPA's provisions anticipate that classified information sought by criminal
defendants is limited in nature. Federal courts are thus free to determine
whether access should be granted to such information and any limitations
158 Al-Haramain Islamic Found, 507 F.3d at 1203.
"s 18 U.S.C. app. § § 1-16 (2000). CIPA creates procedures for the disclosure and utilization
of classified information relating to national security in federal criminal prosecutions. These
procedures include pretrial conferences, protective orders, rules relating to discovery, in camera
hearings, and restrictions upon admissibility. Id. §§ 2-6, 8.
"6o See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
161 Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § l(a) (defining "classified
information" as "any information or material that has been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security and any restricted data as defined in...
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954").
62 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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placed thereon. By contrast, the protected information at the heart of the
plaintiffs' case is much broader. Instead of presenting a discrete issue
regarding a readily definable piece of information, the plaintiffs' entire case
turns on state secrets. Furthermore, Jeppesen will be unable to defend the
litigation without resort to these state secrets. Thus, unlike CIPA, the
information relevant to adjudication of the complaint presents numerous issues
regarding a multitude of facts concerning an entire program. These issues are
judicially unmanageable in the manner contemplated by CIPA, thereby
strengthening the case against creation of ad hoc judicial screening
mechanisms.
Finally, it bears to note that neither the Legislative nor Judicial Branches
have elected to alter the delicate balance between national security and foreign
policy considerations and access to the judicial system as represented by the
state secrets privilege. The current state secrets doctrine has been developed
through the common law process, and courts retain the power to narrow its
scope through that same process.'63 Nevertheless, courts have continued to
defer to the executive branch with respect to national security and foreign
policy questions. To the extent the privilege has constitutional underpinnings,
courts have failed to expand the extent of their review of these questions as far
as the Constitution may allow.' 64 Despite numerous calls to clarify the
privilege, Congress has also failed to restrict the privilege or to expand the
federal judiciary's role in the determination of questions concerning national
security and foreign policy in the fifty-six years since Reynolds.1 65 The refusal
of the two branches of the federal government possessing authority to overturn
or modify the state secrets privilege over the course of more than five decades
weighs strongly in favor of preservation of the constitutional balance between
the executive and judicial branches represented by the privilege.
163 S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 26 (2008).
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2007), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aba081307.pdf, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REFORMING THE
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE, at ii (2007), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Ref
ormingtheStateSecretsPrivilegeStatement.pdf; Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem:
Can Congress Fix It?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 489 (2007). However, efforts to address the privilege
failed in the 110th Congress. See State Secrets Protection Act of 2008, S. 2533, 110th Cong.
(2008). Current efforts to modify the state secrets privilege are contained in the State Secret
Protection Act of 2009 pending in Congress at the time of the preparation of this Article. See
State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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C. The Totten Bar
In addition to the state secrets privilege recognized in Reynolds, prosecution
of the plaintiffs' complaint is also prevented by the so-called "Totten bar."
This common law doctrine arose from the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Totten v. United States, wherein the Court affirmed the dismissal of an action
by the administrator of a former Union spy's estate, alleging breach of a
contract with President Abraham Lincoln to infiltrae the Confederacy.'66 In a
ruling distinct from its descendant in Reynolds, the Totten Court concluded that
it could not permit adjudication of an action for breach of a secret espionage
contract. The Court noted that all of the circumstances surrounding the
contract were confidential. This included the very nature of the service to be
provided and the method by which information was to be obtained and
communicated.' 67
According to the Court, both parties understood the confidential and
clandestine nature of the relationship and that they would be barred from
disclosing or discussing it with others. 168 Although never expressly stated in
the contract, confidentiality was an implied condition of the agreement based
upon the nature of the employment. 69 However, the Court did not limit itself
to the specific contract at issue but expanded its holding to include those based
upon "a secret service," the clandestine obtaining of information to be
communicated in private and circumstances where "the employment and the
service were to be equally concealed," as well as "all secret employments of the
government in time of war, or upon matters affecting... foreign relations,
where a disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass [the U.S.]
government in its public duties, or endanger the person or injure the character
of the agent."' 7 ° Disclosure was forbidden by public policy, which would not
'6 92 U.S. 105-06 (1875). The administrator alleged the spy had performed the requested
duties but had only received reimbursement for expenses rather than the $200 per month
promised by President Lincoln.
167 Id. at 106.
168 Id. The Court held "[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the
other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter." Id.
169 Id.
171 Id. The breadth of the relationships covered by Totten has been reaffirmed in more recent
case law. See Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590, 599 (D. Md. 1992) (holding
that "[tihe state secret that must be protected is the existence of any relationship between the
CIA and [private entities] alleged to be associated with the CIA").
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permit the violation of the confidence surrounding such agreements. 17' As
such, any action based upon these secret agreements was precluded.
7 1
The holding in Totten was reaffirmed one hundred thirty years later in Tenet
v. Doe.1 3 In refusing to permit two former spies sue the U.S. government to
enforce obligations of lifetime support allegedly owed pursuant to covert
espionage agreements, the Court held that Totten's "core concern" was
"preventing the existence of the [espionage] relationship with the Government
from being revealed."' 74  Thus, Totten precluded judicial review of cases
"where success depends upon the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship
with the Government.' ' 75 The breadth of this language indicates that the Totten
bar applies not just to contract actions but any case where proof of a
confidential relationship with the U.S. government is necessary for success on
the merits. 176 The possibility that such a suit could proceed and a confidential
relationship be revealed as a result thereof was unacceptable to the Court.17 7
Equally important was the Court's holding that its modem iteration of the state
secrets privilege in Reynolds did not supplant the Totten bar.
78
171 Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
172 Id. In this regard, the Court stated:
[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the
trial of which Would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the
confidence to be violated .... Much greater reason exists for the application
of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government,
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.
Id.
173 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
174 Id. at 10.
175 Id. at 8.
176 Id. (stating that "[n]o matter the clothing in which alleged spies dress their claims, Totten
precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents' where success depends upon the
existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government"); see also EI-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)
(interpreting Tenet v. Doe to stand for the proposition that "the bar was not limited to contract
actions, but applies whenever a party's 'success depends upon the existence of [a] secret...
relationship with the government' "(quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005))).
'7 Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11.
171 Id. at 9-10. The Court stated in this regard that:
[Reynolds] ... in no way signaled our retreat from Totten's broader holding
that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether
forbidden. Indeed, our opinion in Reynolds refutes this very suggestion:
Citing Totten as a case "where the very subject matter of the action, a contract
to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret," we declared that such a
case was to be "dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question
of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never prevail over
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The holdings in Totten and Tenet provide an additional basis for affirmation
of the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint independent from the state secrets
privilege. As alleged in the complaint, there were contracts between the CIA,
or its transport providers, and Jeppesen regarding the provision of services for
the extraordinary rendition flights) 79 It is indisputable that confidentiality was
an implied condition of these agreements based upon the nature of the
undertakings. s Although these agreements did not specifically relate to
espionage activities, they nevertheless concern a "secret employments of the
government" sufficient to fall within the prohibition upon disclosure set forth
in Totten.' Further disclosure of these agreements would have a negative
impact upon national security and foreign relations, effects which clearly
warrant nondisclosure pursuant to Totten.1
8 2
Nondisclosure of the terms and operation of any agreement between the
CIA and Jeppesen is further prohibited by Tenet's holding regarding the
centrality of the information to the plaintiffs' ultimate success. The Court in
Tenet interpreted Totten to preclude judicial review of cases where success
depends upon the existence of a "secret . . . relationship with the
the privilege .... Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have
replaced the categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets
evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend upon
clandestine spy relationships.
Id. (citation omitted); see also El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 540. The district court in EI-Masri
distinguished the Totten bar from the state secrets privilege as follows:
The Totten bar is quite distinct from the state secrets privilege; it is not a
privilege or a rule of evidence; it is instead a rule of non-justiciability that
deprives courts of their ability to hear "suits against the Government based
on covert espionage agreements" even in the absence of a formal claim of
privilege.
Id.
'79 Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 237, 255,262 (alleging Jeppesen entered into agreements
with the CIA, Premier Executive Transport Services, and Aero Contractors, Ltd. to provide flight
and logistical support for extraordinary rendition flights and participated in a conspiracy to
subject the plaintiffs to forced disappearance and torture).
"0 The confidential nature of the relationship between the CIA and Jeppesen was confirmed
by the company's refusal to comment upon the complaint at the time of its filing. See Gatti,
supra note 1 (quoting Boeing's director of communications Tim Neale as stating that Boeing
could not comment on the complaint "because to do so would mean commenting on the work
Jeppesen does for clients under contracts that call for confidentiality"); see also supra
notes 111-23 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of maintaining the secrecy of the
extraordinary rendition program).
383 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
I82 d. at 106; see also supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37:469
RENDITION AND STATE SECRETS
Government."' 8 3 Tenet in turn has been interpreted to extend the Totten bar
beyond breach of contract suits to any case where proof of a confidential
relationship with the U.S. government is necessary for success on the merits.'"S
As previously noted with respect to the state secrets privilege, the success
of the plaintiffs' case turns in part upon their ability to prove the existence of
contracts between the CIA and Jeppesen relating to extraordinary rendition.
The existence of these contracts cannot be separated from the very question
upon which the complaint depends, specifically, the operational details of the
extraordinary rendition program. The agreements between the CIA and
Jeppesen are so central to the subject matter of the complaint that further
proceedings will necessitate disclosures regarding contractual matters that
should remain confidential pursuant to Totten and Tenet. These contractual
details include how the CIA arranged for the rendition flights, the instructions
and information it disclosed to Jeppesen, how Jeppesen performed its part of
the bargain, and the identities of the parties responsible for negotiations and
performance. By contrast, this information or its effective rebuttal, is central
to Jeppesen's ability to mount a credible defense. Dismissal of the complaint
was thus warranted by the centrality of the agreements to the plaintiffs' claims
and Jeppesen's defenses.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, the Totten bar is not limited to
breach of contract actions between private parties and the government
concerning a confidential agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in El-Masri v. United States is instructive in this regard. 5
In affirming the dismissal of EI-Masri's complaint against then-Director of the
CIA George J. Tenet, and the air transportation companies involved in his
extraordinary rendition from Macedonia to Afghanistan, the Fourth Circuit
found that in order to prevail on his claims against the corporate defendants, El-
Masri would have to demonstrate "the existence and details of CIA espionage
contracts."' 6  According to the court, this endeavor was "practically
indistinguishable from that categorically barred by Totten and Tenet v. Doe."'
8 7
183 Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8.
's See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530,540 (E.D. Va. 2006), aft'd, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting Tenet to stand for the proposition that "the bar was not limited to
contract actions, but applies whenever a party's 'success depends upon the existence of [a]
secret... relationship with the government" (quoting Tener v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005))).
Although the term "success on the merits" remains undefined, there is no language in Tenet or
its subsequent interpretations to limit its meaning to plaintiff's success on the merits. Thus,
"success on the merits" includes plaintiffs, defendants, and third-party defendants.
185 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007).
'86 Id. at 309.
187 Id.
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Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the Totten bar is applicable not only to
cases between the parties to a secret agreement alleging breach of contract, but
also to cases threatening the disclosure of such an agreement. Such is the case
concerning the complaint, which, although one step removed from the
corporate defendants actually providing the air transportation services in Tenet,
nevertheless threatens the disclosure of the negotiation, execution, and
performance of secret agreements.'
Unlike the state secrets privilege, Totten also prohibits disclosure of
clandestine relationships where it might "compromise or embarrass our
government in its public duties."' 89  Further disclosures regarding the
relationship between the CIA and Jeppesen would undoubtedly embarrass the
U.S. government. In addition to harming foreign relations, further disclosures
regarding the specifics of the extraordinary rendition program would result in
greater embarrassment for the U.S. government as a result of its perceived
failure to uphold human rights protections that are deeply engrained in its
national cultures as well as its regional and global commitments.
Embarrassment may result from the impact of further disclosures upon pending
investigations by foreign governments of their complicity in extraordinary
rendition. Detailed disclosures about the program are likely to further degrade
the weakened standing of the United States in the international community.
188 Two federal courts have rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Tenet and refused to
apply the Totten bar to claims arising from federal antiterrorism programs. See Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing to apply the Totten bar to
shield AT&T from liability for permitting the U.S. government to engage in warrantless
surveillance of customers' communications on the basis that the secret agreement was not
between the government and the plaintiff, but rather between the government and AT&T);
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (2007)
(refusing to apply the Totten bar to shield disclosures regarding the government's warrantless
surveillance program on the basis that Totten only applied to "espionage relationship[s]").
However, both of these opinions are inapplicable to the determination of the applicability of the
Totten bar to the complaint. Initially, neither of these opinions addressed the extraordinary
rendition program at issue in EI-Masri or Mohamed. Second, the Hepting and NSA opinions
concerned alleged violations of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens rather than the
international human rights protections of foreign nationals. Although not directly addressed by
the circuit or district courts, it is not inconceivable that federal courts would be more protective
of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens than the human rights of foreign nationals, and thus
more reluctant to apply the Totten bar to citizens' claims. Finally, the district courts' holdings
with respect to the identity of the parties and nature of their relationship are overly restrictive
and contrary to Totten's "core concern" of preventing the public revelation of secret
relationships with the government. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005). By contrast, the Fourth
Circuit's application of the Totten bar to extraordinary rendition claims remains true to this core
concern.
189 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
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The Court also specifically referenced personal endangerment or injury to
an agent's reputation as relevant to the disclosure determination. 9' Further
disclosure of Jeppesen's role in extraordinary rendition would clearly endanger
specific employees as well as the company itself. In their complaint, plaintiffs
allege that two persons employed by Jeppesen were " 'specifically
designated' " to provide services for the extraordinary rendition program.'91
These persons were not identified in the complaint, but further adjudication
would by necessity result in their identification. Identification of these
individuals would undoubtedly be sought by the plaintiffs in discovery and in
open court as the plaintiffs attempt to meet the higher burdens of proof
associated with their ATS and conspiracy claims.192 Revelation of the identities
of other individuals who should remain confidential is also threatened should
adjudication of the complaint proceed. These individuals include other
Jeppesen employees providing services to the extraordinary rendition program
throughout the world and the CIA employees with whom they interacted. All
of these individuals may be subject to increased risk of physical harm,
embarrassment, and injury to their reputations should their participation in
extraordinary rendition be publicly disclosed. Disclosure remains a significant
risk despite any judicial procedures to protect these individuals' identities.
Totten instructs courts to avoid this risk through the maintenance of
confidentiality regarding "secret employments of the government."'1 93
Corporate injury is also relevant to the disclosure determination. This factor
is important given Totten's express concern regarding the "character of the
agent." 94 The impact of disclosure of agreements between Jeppesen and the
CIA upon corporate profitability is relevant assuming Jeppesen is deemed to
be an agent of the CIA as a result of its participation in extraordinary rendition.
Although there is no available evidence to date that Jeppesen or its corporate
parent have suffered economic loss or diminution in share value as a result of
the filing of the complaint, such losses remain a possibility now that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and further
revelations regarding the company's participation may become public. In any
event, Totten does not require that businesses impacted by potential disclosure
of secret agreements with the government demonstrate actual loss. Rather, the
'90 Totten, 92 U.S. at 106 (prohibiting disclosure of clandestine relationships where it might
"endanger the person or injure the character of the agent").
191 Complaint, supra note 1, para. 49.
192 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
'9' Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
194 Id.
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Court's language contemplates the sufficiency of the possibility of harm in
order to warrant nondisclosure.
Of equal concern is the potential for damage to Jeppesen's reputation as a
result of revelations concerning its participation in extraordinary rendition.
Controversy associated with Jeppesen's participation could besmirch its
reputation overnight, and the resultant damage could linger in the public's
conscience for years thereafter.'9" Rehabilitation of reputation and regaining
public trust have been difficult for corporate miscreants such as Nestle, Union
Carbide, and Exxon, who remain inextricably linked to their past misdeeds
despite the passage of time.196
D. State Secrets and Public Disclosure of the Extraordinary Rendition
Program
Although not addressed by the district court or the Ninth Circuit, a final
issue applicable to both the Totten bar and the state secrets privilege concerns
the effect of previous disclosures regarding the extraordinary rendition program
upon the continuing need for secrecy. In addition to the explanation of the
program set forth in the complaint, extraordinary rendition has been the subject
matter of considerable media attention.97 The existence of the program was
also acknowledged by President Bush and administration representatives and
disclosed in reports prepared by other national governments and international
organizations. 9 ' The issue is thus whether these disclosures have effectively
mooted the protections offered by the Totten bar and the state secrets privilege.
If the program is within the realm of public knowledge, then the complaint may
proceed without risk of dismissal on these grounds.
The first issue to be resolved is the determination of reliable sources of
disclosure, which may serve as the basis for concluding that the extraordinary
rendition program is public knowledge. Courts confronted with this issue in
the context of surveillance and renditions have discounted several sources in
determining whether information can no longer be deemed secret. Initially, the
personal knowledge of the plaintiffs is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the facts surrounding their rendition are protected from disclosure by
the state secrets privilege.' 99 Despite their personal knowledge, the plaintiffs
See Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Volunteerism: Social Disclosure and France's Nouvelles
Rgulations Economiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 441,460 (2004).
1% Id,
197 See supra notes 1, 4, 22, 72 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 9-10, 16, 19, 21, 30, 116 and accompanying text.
'9 See EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding EI-Masri's
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would still be required to produce admissible evidence that Jeppesen was
involved in their rendition in such a manner as to incur liability.2°° This
production can only be made with "evidence that exposes how the CIA
organizes, staffs, and supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations,"
evidence that is clearly protected from disclosure by the state secrets
privilege.2°'
The courts have also uniformly disregarded media reports as inherently
unreliable.0 2 Allegations within plaintiffs' pleadings regarding otherwise
secret programs are also deemed unreliable.23  This determination of
unreliability recognizes that "advancing a case in the court of public opinion,
against the United States at large, is an undertaking quite different from
prevailing against specific defendants in a court of law. '2°  Thus, neither
extensive reporting by the media regarding the extraordinary rendition program
nor the detailed allegations contained within the complaint abrogate the state
secrets privilege or the Totten bar.
The only sources of information deemed reliable by the courts are public
admissions or denials by the government or defendants to the litigation.2 5
Applying the reasoning in Hepting and El-Masri, the first and most important
disclosure is that made by the U.S. government. However, none of the
operational details of the extraordinary rendition program have been
declassified by the President or any other U.S. government official, including
whether Jeppesen participated in the program and the extent of such
personal account of his rendition insufficient to overcome the state secrets privilege).
200 Id. at 309 (noting that to prevail the plaintiff "would be obliged to produce admissible
evidence not only that he was detained and interrogated, but that the defendants were involved
in his detention and interrogation in a manner that renders them personally liable").
211 Id.; see also Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1992)
(upholding the dismissal of claims regarding manufacturing and design defects against the maker
of a classified weapons system despite the plaintiffs' production of 2,500 pages of affidavits and
documents, which constituted "substantial evidence from which a judge or jury might find
problems, or even wrongdoing, by [the defendant]").
202 See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(disregarding media reports about the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretap program
because the reliability of such reports was "unclear"). The court reasoned that "simply because
such statements have been publicly made does not mean that the truth of those statements is a
matter of general public knowledge and that verification of the statement is harmless." Id.
at 990.
203 See, e.g., EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530,538 (E.D. Va. 2006), aft'd, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that factual statements in plaintiffs' pleadings are "entirely different
from.., official admission or denial").
204 EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308-09.
205 See, e.g., Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
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participation, if any. Classified information remains protected even if it is
disclosed unless Executive Branch officials make the information public based
upon the determination that the benefits of disclosure outweigh the risks to
national security and foreign relations.2" The recognition that the privilege
belongs to the U.S. government and that the protections it offers may only be
lost by official government action also prevents the disclosure of details of the
program that result from investigations conducted by foreign governments
from serving to introduce the extraordinary rendition program into the public
domain. °7
The disclosures made by the U.S. government to date do not rise to the level
of declassification or otherwise serve to forfeit the protection of the privilege.
The primary disclosure of the extraordinary rendition program was made by
President Bush on September 6,2006.08 However, President Bush's statement,
as well as the statements of other administration representatives, is insufficient
to be deemed a relinquishment of the state secrets privilege or the Totten bar.
Many of these statements concerned the rendition program as it existed before
September 11, which was a separate program from extraordinary rendition.2°
To the extent they addressed the extraordinary rendition program, the
statements were general in nature and lacked the necessary specificity to forfeit
the protections of either the state secrets privilege or the Totten bar.210
This conclusion is consistent with opinions in other cases examining
government antiterrorism programs. For example, in El-Masri v. Tenet, the
district court refused to deem general comments by government officials
admitting the existence of the rendition program to be sufficient to prevent the
206 See Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that disclosure occurs
only where the information alleged to be public matches that which has been released through
"an official and documented disclosure"); see also Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370
(4th Cir. 1975) (holding that classified information is not "in the public domain unless there
[has] been official disclosure of it"); Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315
(Mar. 25, 2003) (providing that material remains classified unless there is a determination that
"the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of
the information").
207 See Raymond Bonner, Britain Defends Court Ruling in Secrecy Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 5, 2009, in which British foreign secretary David Miliband defended a British court's
refusal to release information on the extraordinary rendition of Binyam Mohamed due, in part,
to objections by the U.S. government on the basis that "[tihe issue at stake is not the content of
the intelligence material but the principle at the heart of all intelligence relationships - that a
country retains control of its intelligence information and it cannot be disclosed by foreign
authorities without its consent."
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
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application of the state secrets privilege.2 ' General admissions were
distinguishable from the admission or denial of specific facts regarding El-
Masri's rendition.21 2 Assertion of the privilege may have been compromised
had government officials provided details regarding "the means and methods
employed in these renditions, or the persons, companies or governments
involved. ' 21 1 Statements failing to disclose such operational details could not
defeat application of the state secrets privilege.
This conclusion was adopted by the district court in Hepting v. AT&T Corp.
Although it held the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretap program
to be public knowledge and thus not subject to privileged status, the court was
careful to distinguish disclosures regarding the CIA's extraordinary rendition
214program. Unlike the warrantless wiretapping program, government
disclosures concerning the extraordinary rendition program provided "only
limited sketches of the alleged program. 2 15 Thus, although the government
had "opened the door for judicial inquiry by publicly confirming and denying
material information about its monitoring of communication content," it had
not done so with respect to the extraordinary rendition program.21 6
The two programs were further distinguishable on the basis that the lawsuit
concerning the monitoring program was challenging an admitted government
program, the details of which were well known to the general public. By
contrast, the "whole object" of lawsuits challenging extraordinary rendition
was to reveal the operational details of a previously undisclosed program,
including "the means and methods the foreign intelligence services of this and
other countries used to carry out the program., 21 7 The conclusion to be drawn
from this distinction is that lawsuits focused primarily on compelling disclosure
of secret programs, rather than targeting specific agencies and individuals for
violations of ascertainable rights arising from well-described government
programs, will encounter difficulties in overcoming the state secrets privilege.
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished
another antiterrorism program from the extraordinary rendition program. InAl-
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, the court concluded that the Terrorist
211 E1-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006), affd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007).
212 Id at 537-38.
213 Id. at 537.
214 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
215 Id. at 994.
216 Id. at 996.
217 Id. at 994 (quoting El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), afid, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007)).
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Surveillance Program (TSP) no longer qualified as a state secret due to
widespread disclosures regarding its existence and operation by the federal
government." 8 The TSP was described in a forty-two page white paper, which
included a section defending its legality. Furthermore, the program was
disclosed and publicly discussed by numerous federal officials, including
President Bush, the Attorney General, and the Director of the CIA. These
voluntary disclosures regarding the program's existence, nature, and purpose,
as well as its targets and procedures utilized, constituted "a cascade of
acknowledgements and information" and "doom[ed] the government's
assertion that the very subject matter of this litigation, the existence of a
warrantless surveillance program, is barred by the state secrets privilege." '219
Another source of disclosure is the parties defending the litigation.
Although recent cases challenging aspects of government surveillance and
rendition programs have focused on government defendants, the district court
in Hepting held admissions and denials of private parties to such litigation were
inherently reliable and could also serve as the basis for abrogation of the state
secrets privilege. 220 However, private statements relating to the aspects of the
extraordinary rendition program at issue in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc. are insufficient to constitute an admission or interfere with the application
of the state secrets privilege. As previously noted, Jeppesen has refused to
confirm its involvement in the program or offer official comment on the
plaintiffs' specific allegations.221 In this regard, Jeppesen has perhaps proven
a better guardian of the secrecy of the extraordinary rendition program than the
U.S. government itself. As such, there are no official statements or detailed
acknowledgements by Jeppesen which may serve as the basis for the court to
elect to disregard the state secrets privilege or the Totten bar.
The district court in Hepting identified one additional circumstance in
which the state secrets privilege would be disregarded. Specifically, the court
held that matters "beyond reasonable dispute" are not secret for purposes of the
privilege or the Totten bar.222 The court was somewhat unclear in elaborating
upon those factors that render information "beyond reasonable dispute."
However, it appears that two of these factors are the government and the
defendants' admissions disclosing specific operational details regarding a
218 507 F.3d 1190, 1198-1200 (9th Cir. 2007).
219 Id. at 1193, 1200.
220 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
22! See Gatti, supra note 1 (quoting Boeing's director of communications Tim Neale as
stating that Boeing could not comment on the complaint "because to do so would mean
commenting on the work Jeppesen does for clients under contracts that call for confidentiality").
222 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
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previously secret program." As noted above, neither the government nor
Jeppesen has made such admissions with respect to the extraordinary rendition
program as to render its operational details "beyond reasonable dispute."
The third factor referenced by the Hepting court that may result in a
determination that a specific government program is "beyond reasonable
dispute" is whether the government program could exist without the
"acquiescence and cooperation" of the private party named as a defendant and
seeking to preserve secrecy. 4 In the case of the warrantless wiretap program,
the district court found that AT&T was the largest telecommunications
company in the United States and one of the largest such companies in the
world.225 The court also found that AT&T was the second largest Internet
provider in the United States.226 When combined with the company's long-
standing policy of cooperation with law enforcement authorities, the ubiquity
of these telecommunications services convinced the court that the wiretap
program most likely could not have existed without AT&T's acquiescence and
assistance.227 This also served to convince the court that AT&T's participation
in at least some government programs was beyond dispute.22 Thus, the state
secrets privilege was unavailable as "AT&T's assistance in national security
surveillance [was] hardly the kind of 'secret' that the Totten bar and the state
secrets privilege were intended to protect or that a potential terrorist would fail
to anticipate. ' 229
The application of Hepting's third factor to the extraordinary rendition
program presents a close question. Jeppesen does share many characteristics
with AT&T. Jeppesen dominates the international travel planning industry to
an even greater degree than AT&T dominates the telecommunications field.
This dominance extends not only throughout the United States but also on a
global scale. Furthermore, its services are comprehensive and not limited to a
specific field. Given Jeppesen's position as the national and global leader in
international travel planning, it is tempting to conclude that the CIA's
extraordinary rendition program could not have existed without Jeppesen's
acquiescence, and therefore Jeppesen's assistance is beyond dispute.
223 Id. at 986-89.
224 Id. at 992.
225 Id. The court specifically noted AT&T's bundled local and long distance service was
available in forty-six states encompassing more than 73 million households. Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
72 Id. at 992-93.
229 Id. at 993.
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However, this result is unwarranted for several reasons. First, the program
at issue in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. is extraordinary rendition, a
program which the Hepting court distinguished from the warrantless
surveillance program it concluded was unworthy of protection.230 Second,
unlike Hepting, the government and defendant's disclosures do not support the
conclusion that the extraordinary rendition program is "beyond reasonable
dispute., 231 Even if it is concluded that the extraordinary rendition program
could not have existed without Jeppesen's acquiescence and cooperation, this
factor is outweighed by the absence of acknowledgement of the specific
operational details by the government and Jeppesen. Finally, unlike AT&T,
Jeppesen is not well-known to the general public. While AT&T enjoys almost
universal recognition, Jeppesen's relative obscurity ensures its role in
extraordinary rendition is not commonly known.
Two other reasons for distinguishing Hepting's beyond-reasonable-dispute
standard are worthy of mention. Initially, it must be noted that extraordinary
rendition is a considerably different tool of terrorism interdiction than the
wiretap program at issue in Hepting. Potential terrorists undoubtedly anticipate
that their communications could be subject to interception. This interception
can be easily avoided through changes in methods of communication. Thus,
there is little to be gained from maintaining secrecy surrounding a program that
is well known to potential targets and readily capable of evasion. By contrast,
extraordinary rendition cannot be fully anticipated, and its occurrence is not
subject to safeguards as reliable as those with respect to intercepted
communications. Although potential terrorists may anticipate their
apprehension by law enforcement, the circumstances of such apprehension are
not readily predictable and may occur despite the most diligent precautions.
As a consequence, there is a greater need to maintain secrecy regarding
extraordinary rendition than with respect to wiretapping.
Finally, the Hepting standard is overly presumptive and grants courts
oversight authority not warranted by the state secrets privilege. Application of
the Hepting standard presumes that the CIA would be unable to conduct
extraordinary renditions without Jeppesen's participation. This may indeed be
the case, but there is no evidence in this regard nor reason to believe that the
CIA would not find another method by which to conduct its rendition
operations. Furthermore, by granting courts the authority to determine the
types of secrets subject to protection, and inquire into the minds of potential
terrorists in so doing, the beyond-reasonable-dispute standard provides for
230 Id. at 994.
231 Id. at 991.
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excessive judicial scrutiny in contravention of accepted precedent rejecting
balancing tests in this area, and terminating further inquiry upon the
establishment of a state secret.
V. CONCLUSION
Determinations regarding the merits of extraordinary rendition, specifically,
its consistency with human rights principles or the sovereignty of states or its
impact upon the nation's reputation in the international community, are
premature. Answers to these issues were perhaps best summarized in the
Report on Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers submitted to the European
Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in June 2007.232
However, troubling these concerns may be, the issue in Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc. is a procedural one, specifically, whether U.S. courts should
adjudicate claims asserted by aliens and alleging violations of international
human rights law arising from a program created and implemented in secrecy
and bearing significant consequences for U.S. national security and foreign
policy. The answer to this issue is clearly in the negative despite the shocking
nature of the conduct to which the plaintiffs were allegedly subjected.233
Despite their disturbing nature, such practices "are not proper grist for the
judicial mill" where state secrets are at the core of the plaintiffs' claims and the
privilege is properly invoked.23" As aptly noted by the U.S. Court of Appeals
232 EUR. PARE. Ass., supra note 16, para. 33 7 (concluding the extraordinary rendition policy
involved the commission of numerous unlawful acts, including abductions, the exporting of
torture of suspected terrorists to rogue states in which such practices are commonplace, and the
establishment of detention centers beyond the reach of any judicial supervision, which were
"undeniably... a contributory factor in tarnishing the image of the United States, a country
regarded as a model of democracy and respect for individual freedoms," and it has "severely
affected the moral authority of the United States," become a negative model for other states
combating terrorism or internal dissension, and constituted "a form of contempt" for the
international community).
233 See Holly Wells, Note, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended
Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 995 (2008). Wells concludes that
[e]xtraordinary [r]endition [sic] quite possibly presented the ideal case for
assertion of the state secrets privilege. It involves questions of national
security, terrorism, and covert actions by the government. The program no
doubt involves state secrets. If the program is being used to catch dangerous
terrorists and to prevent them from harming U.S. citizens, then arguably it is
essential for the government to keep information concerning how the program
operates confidential.
Id. (citations omitted).
234 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530,540-41 (E.D. Va. 2006), af'd, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
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for the Fourth Circuit, to hold otherwise grants the judiciary "a roving writ to
ferret out and strike down executive excess"235 no matter the consequences.
While perhaps striking down such executive excesses, the court would also be
"guilty of excess in [its] own right if [it] were to disregard settled legal
principles in order to reach the merits of an executive action that would not
otherwise be before [it]--especially when the challenged action pertains to
military or foreign policy." '236 However poorly conceived and executed and no
matter the negative impact upon the reputation of the United States, the policy
of extraordinary rendition is not subject to remediation through judicial
intervention.
The question thus arises as to the value of the assertion of the claims given
the insurmountable obstacles to their ultimate adjudication. It is unlikely that
the purpose of the complaint is to impose liability for the abuses associated
with extraordinary rendition solely on a private party with perhaps incomplete
knowledge regarding the true nature of the activities it assisted in facilitating.237
Rather, the complaint effectively brings attention to the human rights abuses
undertaken in the name of the American people through the overzealous pursuit
of national security at the expense of fundamental liberties and human dignity.
One may very well be tempted to ask "why bother?" But to a country that was
often tone deaf to human rights issues during the Bush Administration, an
increase in the volume represented by the complaint is victory enough.
Cir. 2007).
235 EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007).
236 Id. at 312.
237 Anthony J. Sebok, A Bid to Litigate the Legality of US.-Sponsored Torture in Federal
Court: WillItSucceed?, FiNDLAW, June 5,2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20070605.
html (expressing distaste for "making firms like Jeppesen [the] scapegoat" for the policy
decisions of the U.S. government and contending courts should place the responsibility for
human rights violations associated with extraordinary rendition on their source of origin,
specifically, the Executive Branch).
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